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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the first sequence draft of the human genome became publicly available.
Since than, sequencing technology underwent truly revolutionary changes, presently
culminating in what is known as ’next-generation sequencing’ (cf. [1]). Through mas-
sive parallelization, decoding complete genomes became a matter of days, resulting in
several thousand organisms being sequenced in less than a decade1. However, genome-
centered technologies were not the only ones to experience a major shift from single-
object analysis (e.g. one or few genes) towards high-throughput assessment of multiple
molecular parameters (e.g. the whole genome). Based upon this novel experimental
technologies also known as omics methods, and further enhanced by the progress made
in information technology (cf. [2]), reconstructing ’complete’ molecular interaction
networks (interactomes) underlying cellular processes became feasible.
However, in order to understand a specific cellular function (e.g. DNA transcrip-
tion, RNA translation, protein synthesis, meiosis, ...), the relevant components of the
molecular network need to be known, i.e. the functional unit embedded in the net-
work has to be identified. More precisely, to comprehend the difference between e.g.
a diseased cellular state and the healthy counterpart, the molecular mechanism under-
lying this very difference needs to be deciphered. In general, it is assumed that only a
rather reduced subnetwork of the complete interaction network is responsible for most
phenotypic observables. In short, specific parts of the molecular networks, known as
functional units, functional modules or pathways, are expected to encode specific cel-
lular functions.
Presently, the most prevalent approach to identify such functional units in networks
is based on the connectivity among the members of a unit, compared to the overall
connectivity in the network. Thus, a unit is defined as a subnetwork which is densely
interconnected (strong intra-connectivity) but only loosely related to the rest of the
network (weak inter-connectivity). Apparently, this notion of a functional unit is driven
by what can easily be measured, but not by a reasonable notion of functionality or unit.
Given that the notion of a functional unit should not be determined by what can be
measured, but rather should the objective of any measurement be determined by a
principled understanding of functional unit, the question arises:
What are functional, evolutionary units in molecular-biological networks?
Even though we have outlined here merely the molecular-biological motivation of
this question (cf. subsection 1.1 for further details), there can hardly be any doubt
1As of today, the genomes of 11.743 organism are publicly available at the National Center for
Biotechnology Information (NCBI-RefSeq: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/RefSeq/)
that the quest for an understanding of biological unity is of general relevance and in-
deed dates back the ’primary substance’ of Aristotle. Furthermore, we explicitly do
not refer to a specific type of biological network such as e.g. genetic networks, signal
transduction networks or regulatory networks. Hence, given that networks as concep-
tual frameworks are suitable to represent and model an enormous variety of processes,
it is reasonable to concentrate on the notion of functional, evolutionary units in a first
step. Once this part of the question is properly addressed, it should be relatively easy to
consider also the network specific aspects. Hence, the primary objective of this work
is to elucidate the question:
What are functional, evolutionary units in biology?
In order to address this question, a first guideline can be obtained from the theory
of natural selection (cf. subsections 1.2, 1.3, 1.4). As a matter of fact, the Darwinian
explanation of evolution as a process of selection and adaptation can arguably be seen
as the single most important theory of biology. Hence, understanding biological units
essentially entails understanding evolutionary units.
However, it has to be recognized that not all aspects of living units can be explained
evolutionary. Indeed, natural selection itself has a series of prerequisites which have to
be satisfied before any kind of evolution becomes feasible. Most importantly, the units
upon which evolution is supposed to act have ’to be there’ in the first place. Thus, we
stand in need of a theory explaining the emergence of units, or, stated more general, a
theory explaining how the precondition of natural selection (cf. subsection 1.5) can be
satisfied.
Finally, we will also examine an attempt to understand biological units beyond the
context of evolution, but rather in the context of cognition (cf. subsection 1.6). Clearly,
our notion of a functional unit in a molecular-biological network directly depends on
our understanding of the ontological status of this very unit: e.g. in what sense does
apoptosis, the functional module responsible for controlled cell death, ’exist’? If apop-
tosis is just an anthropogenic category, can we still expect to find structural criteria
within a network that allow to identify such ’constructed’ units? But apart from the
universal relevance of epistemological issues, the fact that organisms, including homo
sapiens, are usually considered to be biological units as well leads to a rather peculiar
situation: when trying to understand biological units, subject and object of cognition
are identical. Apparently, trying to understand this very situation requires a specific
notion of cognition.
In order to address this aspects, we have concentrated on three different research
foci: First of all the concept of Developmental Systems is sketched as a possible no-
tion of biological units (cf. chapter 2). In contrast to this approach originating from
the philosophy of biology, several formal models proposed by the theoretical biologist
Stuart Kauffman to simulate the emergence of units are outlined (cf. chapter 3). In
chapter 4, several key concepts of the neurobiologist and philosopher Humberto Mat-
urana, such as ’autopoiesis’ and ’structure determined systems’ are briefly introduced.
Finally, in chapter 5, the major findings are summarized and discussed.
2
1.1 Functional units in molecular-biological networks
Throughout the last decade, the development of high throughput techniques capable
of measuring simultaneously an elevated number of molecular parameters has revolu-
tionized molecular biological research. These technologies can be seen as targeting
different levels of cellular organization, namely the level of DNA, RNA, proteins and
metabolites. As a characteristic, they attempt to account for the totality of ”objects”
present at the level under investigation, i.e. the whole genome, transcriptome, proteome
as well as the whole metabolome. Furthermore, not only methods to characterize the
involved molecular entities, but also to identify interactions among them have been de-
veloped. This interactions may be of various different types2, but due to experimental
constraints, direct protein-protein interactions are currently the most frequently mea-
sured ones (cf. [4, p. 928]). Thus, driven by the constantly growing amount of mea-
surable, molecular parameters and publicly available data, a novel research paradigm
gained popularity: systems biology (cf. e.g. [5, 6, 7, 8]).
Through large scale data integration, a holistic (cf. [9]) understanding of cellular
processes on the molecular level shall be achieved. To this end, the molecular states of
the cellular machinery have to be mapped to phenotypic observables such as ”healthy”
or ”diseased”. Hence, in accordance with ”traditional” biology, the ultimate goal of
systems biology is to provide low-level (i.e. molecular level) models for high-level
(i.e. cellular level) observables (cf. e.g. [10, 11]). Whereas there is typically little dis-
agreement concerning the high-level observables, providing a suitable low-level model
and linking it’s states to the observed phenomena can be seen as the key-challenge of
biology. In the context of systems biology, molecular-biological networks represent
the current gold standard model to address this very need (cf. e.g.[12]).
From a formal point of view, the nodes in such a network represent molecular
entities (genes, RNA, proteins, metabolites, small molecules etc.), while the edges
represent the interactions among these entities. Different levels of abstraction can be
distinguished when modeling one and the same molecular system (cf. figure 1.1).
More precisely, a level of abstraction is determined by the number of different types of
nodes respectively edges which are distinguished in the network. Clearly, the impact
of the chosen level of abstraction can hardly be overestimated. However, given the
objective of this inquiry, we will not further discuss this issue but instead assume that
some level of abstraction has been chosen. Furthermore, the problem we are about
to address herein (What are functional units in molecular-biological networks?) is
relatively independent of the specific network type and hence, our results are applicable
to a wide range of different networks respectively levels of abstraction as well.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of network structure and dynamic, a wide
range of analysis techniques has been developed (cf. e.g. [14, 15]). Apart from sta-
tistical measurements suitable to capture global topological network characteristics,
as e.g. the amount of clustering present in the network (average cluster coefficient)
or the average shortest path length between arbitrary pairs of nodes in the network,
2Indeed, ontologies (structured vocabularies) have been defined in order to capture the multitude of
possibilities in which two or more molecular objects may ”interact” [3].
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Figure 1.1: Three network models corresponding to different levels of abstraction are
shown for one and the same simple metabolic pathway. In a very fine-grained repre-
sentation, all interacting metabolites and enzymes (Mg2+) are included in the model
(a). However, depending on the research focus, a more abstract representation con-
centrating on the reaction’s substrates and neglecting enzymes (b) and co-factors such
as the high-energy donor ATP (c) may be more useful. Figure taken from [13]. For
further details, refer to section 1.1
measurements focusing on local properties have been devised as well. For example,
the node-degree defined as the number of edges per node is suitable to identify highly
interconnected nodes (”hubs”)3. While the amount of clustering can be interpreted as
a measurement for the modularity of a network, the edge degree is typically assumed
to be related to the relevance of a node. As a consequence, the distribution of the edge
degrees of all nodes of a network possibly reflects the network’s robustness (redun-
dancy), as a network with many hubs is more susceptible to perturbances (removal of
a node) than a network in which all nodes are equally irrelevant. As an alternative
to purely statistical measurements, an analysis based on frequent subgraphs (network
motifs), typically comprising less than five nodes has been proposed as well (cf. e.g.
[15]).
However, when confronted with a specific medical need as e.g. a disease pheno-
type, neither local (e.g. node degree or network motif) nor global (e.g. average clus-
tering coefficient) analysis methods are suitable to provide a hypothesis on possible
interventions. Instead, meso-scale approaches aiming to identify relevant functional
modules are considered to be the method of choice (cf. e.g. [11, 17, 10]). The intuition
behind this direction of research is rather obvious: in most cases, a phenotypic observ-
able (e.g. a disease) will neither be related to just one molecular entity4 (e.g. a single
3For a rather comprehensive list of existent topological network measurements refer to Platzer et al.
[16]
4Clearly, there are cases in which a change in one single molecular entity is of phenotypic relevance,
as can be seen for example in most heritable genetic diseases. However, the mechanism (pathway) which
establishes the link between molecular cause and phenotypic effect always involves multiple interactors.
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protein), nor to the totality of entities present in the network (e.g. the whole genome),
but to a group of entities performing conjointly the disturbed cellular function. This
is in accordance with the commonplace view that molecular networks are organized in
evolutionary modules (cf. e.g. [18, 19]), i.e. that molecular networks can be decom-
posed in subgraphs which exhibit a certain amount of independence and which can be
assigned a specific cellular function (cf. e.g. [20, 21, 22]). Identified functional mod-
ules, as for example the apoptosis pathway (cf. figure 1.2) can be found in pathway
databases5, such as PANTHER (cf. [24]) and KEGG (cf. [25, 26, 27]).
Figure 1.2: The human apoptosis pathway as depicted in KEGG (cf. [25]). Apoptosis
is a genetically controlled mechanism which induces cell death and hence, is of central
relevance to tissue homeostasis. As can be seen, various causes such as e.g. DNA
damage can trigger a series of molecular events leading to apoptosis. Given that his
very mechanism is malfunctioning in tumor cells, it is one of the best studied functional
modules in human. For further details, refer to section 1.1
Apart from studying known pathways, there are also numerous attempts to identify
novel functional modules in molecular-biological networks. Some of this attempts
are based on the assumption that functional modules are also evolutionary modules:
If a group of molecules conjointly perform a specific cellular function, this group is,
as a whole unit, subject to evolution (cf. e.g. [19, 28]). Hence, when comparing
5A rather comprehensive list of currently available resources can be found at http://www.
pathguide.org/. For an introduction into pathway databases refer to [23]
5
the molecular networks of different species, subnetworks exhibiting a similar structure
in multiple species are taken to be functional units (cf. e.g. [29, 30]). However,
in contrast to this approaches based on cross-species comparisons, the vast majority
of methods proposed to identify functional modules is based on the assumption that
such modules are densely interconnected subgraphs (cf. e.g. [18, 22, 12]). These
methods are mainly heuristics for screening a given network for sets of nodes which
exhibit a (statistically significant) high intra-module connectivity respectively a low
inter-module connectivity, i.e. members of a module are more dependent on other
members of the same module than on external entities.
Given that the relationship between functionality and conservation is beyond any
reasonable doubt, the identification of functional modules based on a cross-species
network comparison appears to be valid. In contrast to this, limiting the notion of func-
tional modules to dense clusters seems to be problematic. The primary difficulty is to
find a suitable structural criterion to identify functional units. Hence, while the concept
of a specific function (e.g. apoptosis) is defined on the phenotypic level, the criterion
we need to identify the corresponding subnetwork has to be defined on the molecular
level. Thus, the challenge is to find a structural (low-level) description of functional
units, departing from a generic (high-level) understanding of functional units. Thus, be-
fore concentrating on the identification of functional modules in molecular-biological
networks, the notion of ”functional units” in general needs to be clarified.
To delimitate the scope of this inquiry, we will concentrate on biological and evo-
lutionary units. Hence, in the next sections, we will outline the theory of natural se-
lection, while putting some focus on it’s universal validity and it’s necessary precondi-
tions.
1.2 Natural selection as optimization
Usually, it is claimed that three requirements need to be fulfilled for Natural Selection
to take place.
”As seen by present day evolutionists, Darwin’s scheme embodies three
principles [...]:
1. Different individuals in a population have different morphologies,
physiologies, and behaviors (phenotypic variation).
2. Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction
in different environments (differential fitness).
3. There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribu-
tion of each to future generations (fitness is heritable).
These three principles embody the principle of evolution by natural selec-
tion. While they hold, a population will undergo evolutionary change.” [31,
p. 1]
First, certain variations have to be present in a population of individuals or, more
precisely, a certain extend of variability is required for each individual. Some of these
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variations have to be linked to differences in the fitness of the individuals and, finally,
some of these fitness-changing variations are heritable. Over the course of time the
process of natural selection leads to populations of continuously increasing (average)
fitness. If just one of these requirements is violated, natural selection can not take place.
A generation of individuals which are exact copies of their ancestors is not able to
change and adapt, variations which do not induce differences in fitness are evolutionary
irrelevant and, finally, variations which can not be passed on to the next generation
can not become traits of a species. An in-depth discussion of this requirements can
be found e.g. in Godfrey-Smith’s essay on the ’conditions for evolution by natural
selection’ [32].
From a purely formal point of view, natural selection can indeed be understood as
mechanism which continuously ’increases’ a certain parameter, namely fitness.
”... we want to understand why selection has favoured particular pheno-
types. The appropriate mathematical tool is optimization theory.”[33, p.
1]
As a matter of fact, the mechanism of natural selection represents a very generic
approach to efficiently solve optimization problems (cf. e.g. [34]) and as such, can be
formulated as a so-called Genetic Algorithm (GA). It is worth having a brief look at
optimization problems and Genetic Algorithms as both concepts will provide us with a
novel understanding of evolution itself.
From a formal point of view, an optimization problem consists in finding the ex-
tremes, i.e. maximum or minimum, of an objective function f (x) = y (cf. figure
1.3). The objective function itself may represent any type of scalable property y which
depends on x and shall be maximized respectively minimized. Note that each maxi-
mization problem can easily be converted into a minimization problem simply by using
f ′(x) = (−1) · f (x) instead of f (x). Needless to mention that quite a number of proce-
dures can be interpreted as optimization problems6, but in order to formally represent
them as optimization problems, the following two requirements need to be fulfilled:
1. Each possible solution to the problem can be represented by x, i.e. we are able
to define a suitable formal representation for possible solutions.
2. We are able to evaluate the quality of each solution, i.e. we are able to define
some f (x) = y such that ’good’ solutions obtain higher values of y than ’bad’
solutions
Now, lets have a look at how the principles of Natural Selection can be used to solve
the problem depicted in figure 1.3. First of all note that the set of all possible solutions
is given by [0..1] and their quality is measured by y. A (basic) Genetic Algorithm can
be described as follows:
6Each time we enter a supermarket, we are in a certain sense solving an optimization problem: we
choose a set of items which we believe to be optimal in some sense, e.g. in terms of price and / or
nutritional value.
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Figure 1.3: An optimization problem consists in finding those values of x for which
some objective function f (x) is extreme. Assuming that in this case we seek the maxi-
mum (located at A: y = 1), the solution is found at approximately x = 0.58. In contrast
to this illustration, the function to be maximized / minimized is usually high dimensional
and / or discrete and thus analytical solutions are no longer applicable and dedicated
methods, such as GAs, are needed. For further details, refer to section 1.2
Algorithm 1 Genetic Algorithm
1: x¯← InitializePopulation()
2: TerminationCriteria← FALSE
3: while TerminationCriteria= FALSE do
4: y¯← f (x¯)
5: z¯← selection(x¯, y¯)
6: x¯← mutation(z¯)
7: TerminationCriteria← terminate(x)
8: end while
In a first step, a population of individuals is initialized. In principle, initializing the
population can be done at random, i.e. any set of viable solutions can be chosen (e.g.
x¯ = {0.1, 0.2, 0.8}. The rest of the algorithm consists of a loop, whose termination is
controlled via some criteria defined in function terminate() (line 7), e.g. a maximum
number of iterations (’generations’) may be chosen. In line 4, the fitness of the popula-
tion is evaluated (e.g. y¯ = {0.4, 0.45, 0.8} = f (x¯)) and in line 5, the ’fit’ individuals are
selected for reproduction. This novel generation (z¯) still resembles exactly the parent
generation (x¯) and thus, in line 6, small variations are introduce. This variations are
simply random modifications of the initial individuals. Note that, in order to maintain
a population of constant size, we need to introduce novel individuals at some point of
the process, given that in line 5 ’unfit’ individuals are removed from the population.
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This can be done by replicating the chosen, fit individuals. The major consequence of
this process is that over the course of time respectively with an increasing number of
iterations (generations), the overall fitness of the population increases.
Thus, when switching back to biological terminology, we obtain the following pic-
ture: In the case of evolution, the objective function consists of the reproductive fitness
of each individual, i.e. the fitness function, while the space of feasible solutions is the
space of all possible biological forms, i.e. the morphospace or phenospace. In this
picture, the change of biological form over time is driven by the differential fitness as-
sociated with those forms. Thus, evolutionary units can be thought of as ’traveling’ on
the fitness landscape, as illustrated in figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4: Evolution as optimization. The process of Natural Selection ’pushes’
species through the space of possible biological forms (’phenospace’ or ’mor-
phospace’) and thus introduces a movements towards forms with increased fitness.
Eventually, this mechanism will yield those species which exhibit optimal properties
and thus, a maximal fitness (the peaks labeled with ’A’). Furthermore, the inclination
of the fitness landscape yields interesting interpretations as well: The selective pressure
always applies vertically, meaning that it does not apply at all to horizontal regions,
like the plateau (’B’). In this region, a high diversity of biological forms is possible,
given that no differential fitness is present. For further details, refer to section 1.2
As the notion of a fitness landscape suggests, the underlying morphospace can
hardly be thought of as unidimensional. However, for the sake of visualization we
are limited to uni-dimensional notions of morphospace (figure 1.4) or 2-dimensional
ones (figure 1.5), bearing in mind that the space we are talking about is actually high-
dimensional. Furthermore, note that even if we are not able to find a parametric repre-
sentation of morphospace7 (i.e. define morphospace in terms of measuarable variables),
7Personally I doubt that a reasonable parametric definition of morhpospace is possible, given the
immense variety of biological forms.
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the notion of a ’space’ in which each ’dot’ a.) corresponds to a possible biological form
and b.) can be assigned a certain ’fitness’ still remains valid. Consequently, the concept
of a fitness landscape and all its derivatives, as illustrated in figures 1.4 and 1.5, still
holds.
Figure 1.5: On the left-hand side, a 2-dimensional illustration of a fitness landscape
is shown, whereas on the right-hand side the evolutionary pressure is depicted as a
force-field over morphospace. The force field is obtained from the gradients (direction
and absolute value of steepest inclination) of the fitness landscape. Using this repre-
sentation of the fitness landscape, the change of a species over time can be understood
as it’s trajectory towards an atractor. Furthermore, each atractor determines a basin
of attraction, i.e. a set of points in morphospace which, when used as the point-of-
departure of a specie’s trajectory, will lead to the attractor itself. For further details,
refer to section 1.2
1.3 Speciation and convergence
If evolution is seen as an optimization procedure, several aspect of it can easily be
explained, such as e.g.:
1. Speciation
2. Convergence (’Parallelism’)
Speciation is the ’evolutionary process by which new biological species arise’8 and
thus represents one of the main phenomena that needs to be explained by any theory
of evolution. In the context of the phylogenetic tree, speciation appears as branching
and is the sole source for an increase in biological diversity. From a genetic point of
8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciation
10
Figure 1.6: On the left-hand side, the main barriers which may inhibit genetic inter-
change between species are shown, while on the right-hand side two forms of speci-
ation, allopatric and sympatric, are illustrated. While allopatric speciation is driven
by habitat isolation, sympatric speciation also occurs without geographical barriers.
An example for sympatric speciation would be a population which develops different
survival strategies in response to environmental changes. This strategies can also be
thought of as alternative solutions to the same problem. As a consequence, the genetic
interchange may dry out and speciation can occur. Both figures are taken from [35].
For further details, refer to section 1.3
view, the main condition which needs to be fulfilled for speciation to occur is an inter-
ruption of genetic exchange (cf. [35]). As long as genetic material can be exchanged
within all members of a species, the species will evolve as a whole, but no splitting
of lineages will occur. If for some reason the flow of genetic material is blocked, spe-
ciation can take place. This blockade of genetic exchange may be cause by a variety
of events, as illustrated in figure 1.6. However, an enumeration of all possible events
leading to an interruption of the genetic flow is hardly possible. Furthermore, note that
the blockade of genetic interchange represents just a necessary, but no sufficient con-
dition of speciation, and ultimately could also be seen as a consequence, but not as a
cause of divergence. In contrast to this, the notion of a fitness landscape provides one
unified explanation for all cases of speciation: A splitting of lineages occurs whenever
a population reaches a border between two different basins of attraction in the fitness
landscape. In figure 1.5, this border is defined by all points which are located at the
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same distance from both maxima. Thus, exploiting the concept of evolution as op-
timization, we are able to formulate a sufficient condition for all cases of speciation,
instead of a merely necessary one.
Convergent evolution, also referred to as parallelism, describes the process by
which phylogenetically dissimilar species develop resemblant forms, due to similar
environmental constraints. Thus, convergence explains why evolutionary non related
species exhibit morphological similarities (analogies), as opposed to inheritance, which
explains why evolutionary related species exhibit morphological similarities (homolo-
gies). Frequently mentioned examples include the overall-shape of dolphins and fish,
bat-wings and bird-wings or the (independently-developed) spikes of hedgehogs (Eu-
rope), porcupines (North America) and spiny anteaters (Australia). In contrast to spe-
ciation, this process decreases the diversity of biological forms and thus could also
be termed morphological confluence. The explanation for this phenomenon is quite
intuitive: some biological traits, such as spikes or wings, are useful in a variety of
situations encountered in different environments. Stated in other words, if unrelated
species are confronted with the same problem, they may indeed come up with (almost)
identical solutions. When considering figure 1.5, it becomes clear that the morpholog-
ical distance between species present in the basin of attraction of one maximum will
eventually decrease, i.e. the trajectories of initially unrelated species are confluent if
both are attracted by the same optimum.
Thus, apparently the notion of natural selection as optimization does have some
explanatory power, as shown by the above examples of speciation and convergence.
However, when having a closer look at these examples, we see that in the case of speci-
ation, the fitness-landscape is located in genospace, while in the case of convergence, it
is located in pheno- respectively morphospace. In the first case, we use the genetic no-
tion of a species and thus can define speciation as an interruption of genetic exchange
between populations. Hence, the units of selection in this scenario are (populations
of) genes. In the second case, we concentrated on changes in the morphospace and
explained phenotypic similarity despite genetic distance by similar requirements posed
by the environment. Hence, in this scenario, the units of selection are (populations of)
organisms respectively of morphological individuals. Apparently, when examining the
evolution (e.g. speciation and convergence) of multiple species, the question needs to
be addressed what a species actually is.
Probably the most well-known definition of a species is the one mentioned above,
which is based on genetic exchange. Regrettably, this definition miserably fails to cap-
ture our preconception of ’species’ when confronted with agamospecies, i.e. species
which do not require genetic exchange for reproduction. Furthermore, genetic ex-
change indeed occurs in nature not only within members of one and the same species,
but also among members of different species. This is known as introgressive hybridiza-
tion and can be found not only among plants, but also among animals as e.g. in the
family of Poeciliidae. In such cases, biologist refer to a different definition of species,
based on morphological similarity. Indeed, there currently is no general definition of
’species’ accepted and applicable in all branches of biology (cf. e.g. [35, p. 445]).
Interestingly, a similar disagreement has to be diagnosed concerning the gene-concept
(cf. [36] for a rejection of the notion of a gene). Given that ’gene’ and ’species’ are ap-
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parently hard to defined, returning to the individual organism as the ultimate unit may
seem attractive at a first glance. However, from a cellular point of view, an organism is
anything but in-dividual, not to mention those organisms which are capable of survival
only in the context of a group, colony or swarm. Clearly, the consequence for mayor
biological fields like taxonomy, phylogeny and the theory of evolution are anything but
negligible.
Thus, given that there is no consensus concerning the notion of a gene or a species
(or an organism), and given that natural selection is supposed to act upon species or
genes, we can conclude that there is no consensus concerning the units of evolution
either. In the following section, we will have a more detailed look at this very issue.
1.4 The units of natural selection
In the previous section we saw that understanding natural selection as an optimiza-
tion mechanism which maximizes fitness provides convenient explanations for phe-
nomenons like speciation and convergence. However, this notion also requires an an-
swer to the question ’what exactly are the units of natural selection?’. Several possible
answers appear to be plausible, such as:
1. organism
2. species
3. gene
If the individual organism is seen as the unit of selection, several objections have
to be made. First of all, evolution, in contrast to development, is defined as the inter-
generational change of traits and thus, an individual organism does not ’evolve’. It
merely develops (itself). Second, when considering one single lineage and the changes
occurring in it over time, all we can see from an evolutionist point of view is that this
lineage is either successful or not. Thus, if a single lineage is taken to be a series of
individual organisms, all we can say over this series is that it either died out or survived.
It either has been selected or not. But it has not been ’shaped’ by natural selection.
Apparently, we have to consider populations of individuals instead, for selection
requires that there is something to chose from. We need multiple individuals in order
to obtain a notion of differential fitness. Indeed, the very feature which is maximized
during natural selection, i.e. fitness, has to be understood as reproductive success.
However, given that natural selection as an optimization strategy is only applicable
to populations of individuals, the question immediately arises how such a population
can be identified. Stated in other words, what population of individuals is a unit of
selection? As a first try, the totality of all living beings could be considered as the (one
and only) unit of evolution. Opposed to this position it has been claimed that the no-
tion of differential fitness requires some sort of comparability. It appears problematic
to claim that e.g. nightingale exhibits a higher fitness than an elephant because it has a
higher number of offspring. When recalling the notion of a fitness landscape (cf. sec-
tion 1.2), we can see that the shape of this landscape is apparently species-dependent:
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elephant and nightingale have different needs and different capabilities. Hence, they
can apparently not be described by the same set of features and thus, can not be located
on the same fitness landscape.
As a consequence, even though the notion of fitness as reproductive success holds
for the entire biosphere, the units of selection have to be considered as populations of
individuals which exhibit similar needs, i.e. they are single species. Individuals per-
taining to one and the same species are located on the same fitness landscape and thus,
their evolution exhibits (retrospective) a specific direction, whereas the evolution of
the biosphere as a whole has no direction, but merely requires a minimal reproductive
success, i.e survival. Nonetheless, as pointed out in section 1.3, defining a species is
an open problem of biology, which in turn is related to a specific notion of inheritance,
namely a gene-centered one.
As mentioned in section 1.2, heritability is a requirement for natural selection.
Given that currently, a gene-centric notion of inheritance is prevailing in biological
research, a gene-centric notion of selection has been proposed (cf. ”The selfish gene”
by R. Dawkins [37]). Only traits which are heritable can become subject of evolution
through natural selection, and if the mechanism of inheritance is assumed to be genetic,
genes have to be seen as the ultimate units of natural selection. Nonetheless, depart-
ing from a principled notion of inheritance as intergenerational continuity it becomes
clear that genetic inheritance is just one out of multiple inheritance systems. Hence, a
genetic notion of the units of selection becomes questionable.
Indeed, the rejection of a purely genetic notion of inheritance is the point of depar-
ture for Developmental Systems Theory, which aims to provide an integrated notion of
the units of evolution by means of the concept of ”Developmental Systems”. Not the
individual organism, nor the species, nor the genes are proposed as the units of selec-
tion, but the ”...whole matrix of resources that interacts to reconstruct that life cycle”
[38, p. 2]. This approach will be outlined in greater detail in chapter 2.
1.5 The emergence of units
In order to obtain a principled definition of the units of selection, an investigation of
the principles of natural selection has to be carried out. More precisely, given that we
are trying to define the units of selection (among others) based on the role they have
got to play in the context of natural selection, an inquiry concerning the limits and the
prerequisites of natural selection is needed. To carry out this inquiry, we will follow a
series of arguments provided by S. Kauffman (cf. chapter 3).
First and foremost it has to be noticed that natural selection just by itself does not
generate units, but merely changes and modifies pre-existing ones. Hence Kauffman
claims that natural selection, just by itself, can not be seen as the sole source of or-
der. A second principle, self-organization, is needed to explain the emergence of units
which are further shaped and molded by natural selection. The difficulties involved in
providing a mechanistic explanation for the emergence of living units relies, according
to Kauffman, primarily in their astonishing complexity. Even the most primitive free
living organism exhibits an incredible level of complexity when compared to purely
chemical systems. Hence, proposing a model of self-organization which is capable
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of explaining how such a living unit could have emerged in an exclusively chemical
milieu is seen as the core-challenge. This challenge is addressed by the theory of auto-
catalytic sets, which basically relies on circles of positive feedback among the elements
of the set. Even though Kauffman concentrates on the origin of life and hence, on the
emergence of the first primordial cell, the basic structure of his model can be seen as a
general answer to the question how higher order units can emerge from the autonomous
interplay of lower-level components.
Second, as we have mentioned before (cf. section 1.2), differential fitness and in-
heritance are prerequisites of natural selection too. Given that differential fitness is
understood as differences in the reproductive success of a unit, reproduction can be
seen the most basic capability a unit has to exhibit in order to become a unit of se-
lection. Units which do not reproduce themselves can not evolve. Furthermore, the
offspring generated needs to resemble the parent, i.e. the process of reproduction needs
to guarantee a certain amount of stability. On the other hand, were the offspring identi-
cal to the parent, evolution would not be possible either, i.e. reproduction also needs to
allow for a certain amount of variability. Addressing this issues, Kauffman proposes a
specific type of Boolean networks (namely NK-networks) to illustrate how a suitable
balance between variability (chaos) and stability (order) could be achieved.
Third, when re-considering the familiar notion of a fitness landscape, Kauffman
points out that this landscape has to exhibit a certain shape for natural selection to
work. More precisely, a small change of the phenotype has to correlate with a small
change in reproductive fitness, and vice versa. If a small change of the phenotype
causes a major change in fitness, the corresponding fitness landscape is very mountain-
ous, consisting of pinnacles, abysms and steep peaks. On such a landscape, continu-
ously walking uphill will get stuck in poor local optima very soon. Gradual evolution
through continuous accumulation of minor improvements is not feasible on such a
landscape. Using modified boolean network models, Kauffman argues that a modular
organization is require for evolutionary units in order to guarantee a fitness landscape
which exhibits the desired correlation between phenotypic change and change in fit-
ness.
1.6 Cognitive units
In contrast to Developmental Systems Theory (cf. chapter 2) and Stuart Kauffman (cf.
chapter 3), Humberto Maturana (cf. chapter 4) introduces epistemological aspects
into the discussion about the units of natural selection. He considers the units of natural
selection as cognitive units and thus, his notion of life and his notion of cognition are
intimately related. Most importantly, he takes into account that this very discussion
is carried out by the units which are to be understood. Hence, he acknowledges the
inherent circularity of the attempt to understand cognition.
As an immediate consequence, he rejects representationism for this model of cog-
nition is apparently incapable of describing itself. Representationism itself can not be
understood within a representationistic framework, as it considers cognition as a lin-
ear process from reality to knowledge: based on sensual perception and the reasoning
about it, an image of the objective, external reality is generated. Given that the image
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corresponds reality, it is considered as a true image. As a second objection, the prob-
lem needs to be addressed how the correspondence between image and reality can be
assessed. Apparently, some sort of ’direct’, ’reliable’, ’undistorted’ or ’pure’ access to
reality is needed to be able to carry out the required comparison between reality and
image. However, if we had such an access, there would be no epistemological problem.
As a third and final objection, it has to mentioned that in there is no subject of cognition
in the representationist’s model. Knowledge as well as cognition are treated as if they
had some subject-independent existence.
Maturana in contrast emphasizes that the subject of cognition is actively taking part
in the process of cognition and hence, also contributes to the construction of knowl-
edge itself. Whereas in representationism, knowledge is acquired from reality, reality
itself is know seen as unknown and hence has to be (re-)constructed from ’knowl-
edge’. Clearly, this situation entails a radical shift of the meaning of ’reality’ and
’knowledge’, but does not necessarily lead to solipsism. Indeed, Maturana claims that
solipsism arises from demanding objectivistic properties from a non-objectivistic cog-
nitive domain: if someone demands to know if the statement ’that there is no objective
truth’ is objectively true, he or she does not take the statement seriously. Against this
background, science has to be understood as a specific way to answer questions. Both
the question (or problem) itself as well as the criteria the answer (or explanation) has
to satisfy are ultimately arbitrary. Luckily, the criteria an explanation needs to fulfill
to be considered as scientific are already well-established by society. Hence, the exis-
tent socio-cultural context provides the criteria scientific knowledge has to satisfy to be
considered as such.
Against this epistemological background, Maturana attempts to provide a scientific
explanation of the mechanism underlying the emergence of cognitive units. As each
unit that we (the observer) perceive as such is the result of an operation that we our-
selves actively make, namely a distinction, the key question to be addressed is: ’what
kind of distinction brings forth a cognitive unit?’. As a matter of fact this very dis-
tinction has just been made in the previous sentence. It is the operation of distinction
which brings forth an observer and hence, a cognitive unit is defined by this very ca-
pability. According to Maturana, this very lines can be understood as the emergence
of the observer, i.e. they establish a distinction (definition) which generates a cognitive
unit.
Given the circularity of cognition, a cognitive unit has to be seen as autonomous, for
it is self-defining. Taking the identity between living and cognitive units into account,
this autonomy translates into the notion of structure-determined systems. Such sys-
tems, which include living, cognitive units, are determined by their very own, internal
structure, and not by the environment or milieu they happen to be in. The interaction
among multiple such autonomous units is characterized by the term of structural cou-
pling. In contrast to the structure of a system, which is given by specific, concrete
components and relations among them, the organization of a system determines the
system’s class identity. Multiple structures can realize one and the same organization.
Now, the organization of living units is defined as an autopoietic one, i.e. living systems
are not only self-organizing, but self-creating, just as we saw in the above definition of
the observer as a cognitive unit.
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Chapter 2
DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS THEORY
The historical background against which Developmental Systems Theory (DST)
argues is constituted by a gene-centered vision of evolution, which is summarized by P.
Griffiths as follows (cf. also [39]):
”Natural selection occurs because individuals vary, some of these varia-
tions are linked to differences in fitness, and some of those variants are
heritable [...]. Because variants that are not heritable cannot play a role
in natural selection, and because the mechanism of inheritance is pre-
sumed to be genetic, evolution is defined as change in gene frequencies.
In the 1960s and 1970s this gene-centered vision of inheritance was ex-
tended to yield a gene-centered view of selection [...]. According to gene-
selectionism, the fact that individual genes are integrated into larger units,
from genetic modules to entire phenotypes, is merely a special case of the
fact that the fitness of any evolutionary unit is a function of the environment
in which it happens to find itself. ” [38, p. 1].
The observation that offspring typically resemble their parents is hardly anything
but obvious and probably has already been made some millennia ago. However, under-
standing the hereditary mechanism underlying this resemblance is anything but trivial
and the first mayor breakthrough in this respect - the discovery of the double-helix
structure of the DNA by Watson and Crick - was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1962.
Even today, the exact details of the molecular machinery behind inheritance are not
completely understood (cf. e.g. [40]), but nonetheless the central role of DNA is be-
yond doubt.
In the first decades after Watson and Crick, with an ever increasing understand-
ing of the molecular mechanics governing inheritance, the understanding of evolution
itself evolved: given that the mechanism of inheritance was genetic, the units of evo-
lution, upon which natural selection acts, were no longer species (as proposed e.g. by
K. Lorenz) nor individual organisms, but individual genes. The DNA molecule itself
entered center stage as the ultimate convergence point of evolutionary change, while
the ’enclosing organism’ became part of the environment acting upon the DNA and
selecting the ’fit’ genes.
In this gene-centered view, we are nothing but vessels for our genes, carefully
’programmed’ and ’designed’ by them and for them. The DNA was identified as the
’blueprint’ of an organism, whose only objective is to replicate this very blueprint,
for DNA which fails to replicate will eventually leave the stage. In this picture, ’life’
was understood as ’DNA-Software’ which was executed by the ’Organism-Hardware’.
Thus, as a second consequence of a purely genetic notion of inheritance, the organism
itself and its development are as external to its genes as any other environmental factors
such as ”rainfall of predator density” [38, p. 1]. Consequently, the study of evolution
and the study of development are completely separated.
In contrast to gene-selectionism, DST emphasizes the importance of extra-genetic
inheritance, which in turn leads to a novel concept of the units of evolution:
”The result is an account of evolution in which the fundamental unit that
undergoes natural selection is neither the individual gene nor the pheno-
type, but the life cycle generated through the interaction of a developing
organism with its environment. In our usage, the developmental system
is the whole matrix of resources that interacts to reconstruct that life cy-
cle.” [38, p. 2].
Indeed, the claim that extra-genetic inheritance plays a crucial role evolution can
be seen as the point of departure for DST and thus, will be discussed in section 2.1.
Given that the relevance of extra-genetic inheritance is accepted - and we do accept it
as we will see - the evolutionary units needs to be re-defined. Section 2.2 is dedicated
to the discussion of the evolutionary units proposed by DST, namely Developmental
Systems.
2.1 Extra-genetic inheritance
Given that the notion of extra-genetic inheritance is a core element of Developmental
Systems Theory, we have dedicated this section to arguments supporting this very view.
Departing from a principled notion of inheritance as the continuity between parent
and offspring, empirical evidence can be provided supporting the existence of extra-
genetic inheritance. Stated less formally, we claim that it can literately be seen that
there is more than nuclear DNA being passed on from generation to generation (cf.
subsection 2.1.1).
Furthermore, when concentrating on the notion of an evolutionary unit, we have
to realize that the mechanisms of natural selection are ignorant with respect to the
underlying mechanism of inheritance. Thus, from an evolutionary point of view, we
can define ’inheritance’ as a mechanism which establishes a specific relation between
evolutionary units. The exact properties of this relation, namely a specific balance
between stability and variability, are dictated by the principles of natural selection.
Hence, assuming more than just one single, gene-based inheritance system appears
reasonable (cf. subsection 2.1.2).
Finally, some authors are willing to accept that ’in a certain sense’, extra-genetic
inheritance exists, but argue that its relevance is a very limited one, when compared to
genetic inheritance. In subsection 2.1.3, we will have a brief look at two common argu-
ments, which try to reduced the relevance of extra-genetic inheritance. The first of this
arguments is based on the notion of some ’developmental information’ conveyed by
DNA, in contrast to non-genetic inheritance mechanisms. More precisely, the concept
of ’information’ is employed to demonstrate that genes transmit information, while
other developmental resources do not. We will counter this argument by showing that
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the concept of ’information’ is in general inappropriate to talk about inheritance. Fur-
thermore, it also has been argued that only genes have unlimited evolutionary potential,
and thus, are the ’most relevant’ heritable resource. Again, we claim that a gene which
is never transcribed due to a lack of extra-genetic resources has not potential at all and
thus, can hardly be seen as more relevant than any other, equally necessary resource.
2.1.1 More than nuclear DNA
To begin with, the trivial observation that a piece of DNA placed in a petri dish hardly
suffices to ’produce’ a living organism may be illustrative. Obviously, some more
ingredients are needed to provide a viable package of resources which is able to give
rise to a new individual. And these are exactly the extra-genetic resources this section
is about, i.e.:
”What does an organism inherit? Certainly more than nuclear DNA.” [41,
p. 195].
This claim for the existence of extra-genetic inheritance can be empirically veri-
fied on a variety of levels. First, we can observe that DNA is always embedded into
the astonishingly complex machinery of a cell1 and also passed on only within this
environment. Outside of this protected environment, the fragile DNA molecule is nei-
ther stable nor can it replicate itself. Thus, apart from a variety of membranes and
organelles which enable the cell to maintain precisely those chemical conditions which
allow DNA to persist, the whole transcriptional machinery translating DNA to mRNA
and mRNA to amino acid sequences needs to be present as well.
On a second level, we can observe that the presence of cellular resources is not yet
enough:
”But unpacking the inherited resources in the cell is not the end of un-
packing inheritance. In multi-cellular organisms the parental generation
typically contributes extra-cellular resources.” [41, p. 195].
The range of examples illustrating the contribution of extra-cellular resources to a
growing organism by its parents is almost unlimited: In viviparous organisms, the con-
ditions provided by the womb are essential for the normal development of the offspring.
But also for oviparous species, it holds that an egg positioned at a randomly chosen
spot will hardly be able to survive, let alone all those oviparous species with extensive
parental care. In a huge variety of (typically rather complex) organisms, parental care
continues after birth. Furthermore, in most social life-forms, the resources needed for
the development of an offspring have to be provided by the population as a whole, as
a single parent is not able to do so. Stated in other words, some organisms (including
1At least in all free living life-forms, which excludes viruses. However, the limitations of ’naked
DNA’ are particularly obvious in viruses, as they need to rely on very specific ’foreign’ resources in
order to generate offspring. This intimate host-virus relationships and their well-known co-evolution
nicely demonstrates the relevance of extra-genetic resources to virus evolution.
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homo sapiens) are able to develop and survive only within the protective context of a
group (herd, swarm, etc.).
But this is not yet the end of extra-genetic inheritance:
”Even after the resources created by the population as a whole are added
in, a range of other factors must be present before the sum of the available
resources adds up to a viable package. [...] While the evolving lineage
cannot make these resources, it can still make them part of its develop-
mental system.” [41, p. 196].
In the above quote, P. Griffiths refers to environmental resources which are ’in-
dependent’2 of the species itself, like climatic conditions or soil quality. Given that
such resources can not be produced by the species itself, even though they constitute
a vital factor for it, the species needs to position itself on favorable spots where its re-
quirements are met. Thus these resources become a (presumably constant) part of the
developmental system.
Recapitulating, it can be said that extra-genetic resources frequently need to be
inherited on multiple levels in order to generate viable offspring:
1. cellular resources
2. extra-cellular resources, including parental care
3. social resources, i.e. resources provided by the population as whole
4. environmental resources, i.e. resources which can not be generated by the species
Hardly anybody would question the relevance of these resources for the develop-
ment and the life-cycle of an organism. Nonetheless, few people would say that these
resources are inherited and thus, are subject to evolution:
”A traditional way to privilege genes over other causes in development is
to argue that genes are the only things organisms inherit from their ances-
tors. Hence the biological nature of organisms must be in the genes. DST
insists on a definition of inheritance that explicitly recognizes the wide
range of resources that are ”passed on” and are thus available to recon-
struct the organism’s life cycle.” [42, p. 3].
I suspect that one of the reasons for this controversy may be the following one: the
mechanism of inheritance for genetic and extra-genetic resources is completely differ-
ent. Taking into account that deciphering the molecular basis of genetic inheritance
actually was a major scientific breakthrough, it becomes plausible that the notion of
inheritance itself became related to the mechanism of DNA replication and variation.
However, DST does not negate the relevance of genetic inheritance, but rather claims
2We are conscious of the difficulties involved in the notion of ’independent resources’. This very
difficulties will be discussed in section 2.2.1
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that the term ’inheritance’ should be defined based on its role in evolution, and not
based on some specific mechanism (type, form, etc.) of inheritance. Stated in other
words, instead of interpreting natural selection based on an exclusively genetic notion
of inheritance, the theory of natural selection should provide us with a generic under-
standing of inheritance:
”Many non-genetic resources are reliably passed on across the genera-
tions. Variations in these resources can be passed on, causing changes in
the life cycle of the next generation [...]. DST applies the concept of inher-
itance to any resource that is reliably present in successive generations,
...” [38, p. 3]
Thus, heritability is now defined as a resource which is reliably passed on or which
is reliably present in successive generations. As such, it may also exhibit a certain
variability and thus may lead to differential fitness.
However, this notion of inheritance poses the question what a resource actually is,
or, more precisely, how can we know which resources are actually relevant for a specific
Developmental System, and which are not? Apparently, this question directly relates
to the quest for a definition of the units of evolution, which is discussed in section 2.2.
2.1.2 Natural selection
As we have seen, the mechanism of natural selection is not limited to any specific
domain. Indeed, it represents a very generic optimization strategy which does not
depend upon some specific mechanism of inheritance:
”It is important to note a certain generality in the principles [of natural
selection]. No particular mechanism of inheritance is specified, but only a
correlation in fitness between parent and offspring. The population would
evolve whether the correlation between parent and offspring arose from
Mendelian, cytoplasmic, or cultural inheritance.” [31, p. 1]
Consequently, as pointed out before, natural selection provides no clues what so
ever with respect to the mechanism of inheritance, but rather requires that, over the
course of the generations, the units of evolutions (traits, properties, organisms, ...)
maintain a certain balance between stability and variability. Clearly, without a cer-
tain amount of stability, we hardly would speak of a unit which somehow remains the
same over the course of time, i.e. an completely unstable unit would be no (evolution-
ary) unit at all. For what concerns variability, it represents the possibility respectively
the ability to change, and thus, to evolve. As outlined in the previous section, these two
properties are not only met by genetic inheritance. Note that, if inheritance is used to
refer to the resemblance between parents and offspring, it is roughly equivalent to our
notion of stability.
Thus, as an immediate consequence of this extended notion of inheritance as a
balance between stability and variability it follows that ...
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”... the power of selective explanations need not be limited to genetic
changes. The range of phenomena that can be given selective explana-
tion should be expanded to include differences dependent upon chromatin
marking systems [..], prions [..], dietary cues in maternal milk, cultural
traditions and ecological inheritance [..].” [38, p. 4]
As we can see, we are clearly transcending the traditional notion of natural selection
by claiming that also cultural traditions are - in principle - subject to the very same
laws that govern the evolution of life. Even though we basically accept this claim as
the logical consequence of natural selection as a generic optimization strategy, caution
is needed: Can the emergence respectively extinction of cultural traditions be explained
via their relevance for the ’fitness’ of the ’carrier population’? If fitness is understood as
reproduction rate, apparently not, given that cultural traditions, like religion, clothing
habits or language, are not only passed on from parents to children (’inherited’), but
are also directly interchanged among individuals or groups.
Thus, it might be useful considering the possibility of multiple interwoven systems
of inheritance and evolution. This approach would allow to distinguish between e.g.
’cultural’, ’biological’ and also ’genetic’ inheritance resp. evolution. However, this
approach would also require to delimitate where one evolutionary systems ends and
where another one begins. Stated in other words, if evolution is assumed to take place
on multiple intertwined ’levels’ or ’domains’, we are confronted with the very objective
of this inquiry: to develop a proper understanding of the units of evolution.
Now, when trying to identify the units of evolutions, it is instructive to have one
more look at gene-centrism: assuming exclusively one specific mechanism of inheri-
tance apparently leads to one specific notion of evolutionary units. If genes were the
only thing which is reliably passed on from parents to offspring, they would be the only
starting point for natural selection to do its job. Thus, gene-centrism provides us with
a hint on how to tackle the problem of evolutionary units: they can possibly be defined
via the identification of a mechanism of inheritance. In a certain sense, defining the
mechanism of inheritance is equivalent to defining the units of evolution.
Summarizing, even though we recognize that the mechanism of natural selection is
very generic and thus, can not be limited to genetic inheritance, two challenges need
to be confronted if selective explanation shall be applied: a.) the direction of evolution
needs to be identified, i.e. the suitability of ’fitness as reproductive success’ has to
be proven; b.) the units of evolution need to be identified. Clearly, these tasks are
interrelated.
2.1.3 The relevance of extra-genetic inheritance
Even if the presence of extra-genetic inheritance is accepted, a variety of attempts to
reduce its relevance exist. Basically, these attempts try to show that, in a certain sense,
genes are the ’core’, the ’center’ or the ’most important part’ of evolution. Within the
following paragraphs, we will outline and reject the most frequent arguments used to
diminish the role of extra-genetic inheritance.
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Only genes transmit information
Genes are frequently believed to contain a ’program’ which is executed during de-
velopment. They somehow contain the ’body plan’ of an organism which is simply
’implemented’ or ’unfolded’ during an organism’s life cycle. Traits of an organism are
seen as ’encoded’ by the DNA and thus, ultimately, the whole phenotype is just a mere
’reflection’ or ’manifestation’ of the information present in the genes (cf. e.g. [43, p.
35] for such a notion of information).
Now, the most natural way to investigate the idea that DNA represents some sort of
information is to use information theory. Its mathematical formulation, as provided by
Shannon and Weaver in 1949 (cf. [44]), is situated in the context of a sender-channel-
receiver model. A sender transmits information via some channel to a receiver if the
states of both the receiver and the sender are correlated. Just to give an example: if
somebody is reading this lines without changing his or her (cognitive) state, no infor-
mation has been transmitted.
When applying these concepts of information theory to biology, the genes (DNA)
are typically taken to be the sender, while all the developmental resources needed to
’transmit’ the DNA-information are seen as the channel. Finally, the life cycle of the
organism represents the signal (respectively the receiver) itself. So far, so good. But
an important aspect of information theory is the role of the channel and the source:
”... in information theory, the role of the source and channel condition can
be reversed. A source is simply one channel condition whose current state
the signal is being used to investigate.” [42, p. 5]
This basically means that the media - the channel, the context - which is used to
transport or transmit a certain message is as important for the meaning of the mes-
sage as the message itself. From the point of view of information theory, channel and
sender can not be distinguished. Their roles can be interchanged. Applied to the above
interpretation of DNA as the sender which transmits information via the channel of
developmental resources, we have to recognize that the later are as much a source of
information as the former. Stated in other words, the exclusive status of genes as a
carrier of (some sort of) information can not be maintained in the light of informa-
tion theory. Nonetheless, the apparent differences which exist between developmental
resources as diverse as parental care and DNA shall not be neglected. But:
”The point is that these empirical differences between the role of DNA and
that of other inherited developmental factors do not imply the metaphysical
distinction between form and matter that is often inferred from them.” [38,
p. 6]
Indeed, it is perfectly normal that in an experiment either the environmental condi-
tions or the genotype, as e.g. in twin research, is held constant while varying the other
factor. Thus, the actual contribution of each of this sources to the phenotype can be
investigated. Summarizing it can be said that, ...
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”...while many concepts of information can be applied to the role of genes
in development, it appears unlikely that any of these captures the intu-
ition that genes supply information and other developmental causes do
not.” [38, p. 6]
Only genes have unlimited evolutionary potential
John Maynard introduces the distinction between ’limited’ and ’unlimited’ inheritance
systems in [45]. It is claimed that the genetic inheritance system has an unlimited
evolutionary potential, in contrast to other systems of inheritance:
”Most non-genetic inheritance systems [...] can only mutate between a
limited number of states. In contrast, [...] genome and language both
have recursive, hierarchical structures, and hence an indefinite number of
possible heritable states.” [41, p. 200]
While DST indeed agrees with this observation, the relevance of this distinction
should not be over-estimated for a number of reasons:
”Since the genome represents only a part of the entire developmental en-
semble, it cannot by itself contain or cause the form that results. But then,
neither can its surroundings.” [46, p. 19]
As already mentioned (cf. subsection 2.1.1), the DNA just by itself can not be seen
as an inheritance system. Therefore, even if the genetic inheritance system bears an
unlimited potential, it still depends upon the presence of limited, non-genetic inheri-
tance to unfold this potential. As an immediate consequence of the interdependence of
multiple inheritance systems, we find that:
”Adding one form of inheritance to another causes a multiplication of evo-
lutionary possibilities, not just an addition to them.” [41, p. 201]
Thus, even though genetic inheritance exhibits a unique structure, it can hardly
be seen as dominating other forms of inheritance. Stated in other words, non-genetic
inheritance does not provide some sort of immutable basis, upon which the highly-
potential genetic inheritance takes place, but rather a full-valued partner, i.e. both
inheritance systems are equally subject to natural selection. Finally, it has to be no-
ticed that the unlimited character of genetic inheritance is, in first place, visible on the
molecular level:
”Second, from a selectionist viewpoint the combinatorial richness of an in-
heritance system must be measured in terms of the number of different phe-
notypic effects, not just the number of combinations of components” [38,
p. 7]
When it comes to the potential of an inheritance system, what ultimately matters
is not some numerical or structural property of the mechanism of inheritance, but its
relevance in the course of natural selection, i.e. its potential on the phenotypic level.
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2.2 The units of evolution
In order to apply the mechanisms of natural selection, we apparently need to establish a
boundary between some (evolutionary) unit and an environment which forces this unit
to evolve. When tracing the historical development of the idea of natural selection, the
following three different notions of an evolutionary unit can be identified:
1. Genotype or DNA (Gene-Centrism)
2. Phenotype or Organism (Traditional Darwinism)
3. Ecosystem, including Geno- and Phenotype (DST)
As outlined in the previous section, DST clearly favors the third option, which
will be further discussed in the following subsections. A possible illustration of these
three alternatives is depicted in figure 2.1. Please note that the term ’ecosystem’ might
be misleading, given that a Developmental System is defined as the whole matrix of
resources needed to reliably reconstruct the life cycle of the system. However, in any
case a Developmental Systems definitively extends the traditional notion of a phenotype
and thus, intuitively resembles what is commonly considered an ecosystem centered
around a species.
Figure 2.1: Three alternatives to establish unit-environment boundaries: Darwin iden-
tified the individual organism as the unit upon which the environment acts (boundary
B), while according to gene-centrism, both the organism (including its development)
and the ecosystem exert selective pressure upon the genes (boundary A). Based on an
extended notion of inheritance, Developmental Systems Theory proposes the totality
of developmental resources (DNA, Organism, Ecosystem) as the fundamental unit of
evolution (boundary C). For further details, refer to section 2.2
In the following subsection 2.2.1, we will have a brief look at the change of the
concept of an evolutionary unit on a rather formal level, i.e. neglecting any empiri-
cal aspects. We will see that DST, in a certain sense, dissolves the unit of evolution by
merging it into the environment. Even thought there are indeed strong arguments favor-
ing this notion of a somewhat ’dissolved’ or ’open’ unit, a series of difficulties arise as
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well, which will be examined in subsection 2.2.2. In some respect, tackling this diffi-
culties means reconstructing the units de novo by re-introducing a system-environment
boundary. Finally, in subsection 2.2.3, we will outline the concepts proposed by DST
to model the internal structure of evolutionary units.
2.2.1 Dissolving units
Informally stated, the evolution of the notion of a Developmental System (DS) is driven
by the insight that in nature, hardly anything is completely independent and hardly any
interaction is purely uni-directional. This intuitive view on DS is roughly sketched in
figure 2.2. A slightly more abstract and thus, possibly less intuitive view on DST is
shown in figure 2.3. Please note that the basic concepts and their relations are identical
in both figures, i.e. they represent alternative yet equivalent ways to illustrate three
different notions of a functional unit.
Figure 2.2: Three different views on evolution: A.) an evolutionary unit is forced to
adapt to an independent environment, B.) an evolutionary unit and its environment
are co-evolving and C.) the strict boundary between unit and environment has been
dissolved and the resulting Developmental System (DST) evolves according to its own
internal dynamics. For details, refer to section 2.2.1
Metaphorically speaking, if the amount of bi-directional dependence present in
evolution is increased, we obtain a series of different scenarios corresponding to the
subfigures A.) - C.) in figure 2.2 and 2.3. In the following paragraphs, we will have a
more detailed look at each of theses scenarios.
Units are shaped by the environment
This notion of evolution has be characterized by R. Lewontin as the ’lock and key’
model of adaptation (cf. also [47, 48]):
”... the model of the world in which there is an outside force, the pre-
existen environment, that dictates the ”problems” organisms must solve,
and inside forces of variation that generate the organisms’ ”solutions” to
the ”problems”. Organisms map the autonomous external changes in the
world.” [49, p.100]
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It corresponds to the concept of an organism-independent environment which de-
fines a fitness landscape, on which the organisms are traveling. P. Griffiths [38, p. 10]
called this concept ”traditional neo-Darwinism” and pointed out that even within this
framework, change in the environment can take place, but not as a consequence of
the state of the organism in it. Likewise, the fitness landscape can change, but, once
more, this change is not drive by the evolution of the organism. From a formal point of
view, the change of the environment over time is exclusively a function of the (previous
state of) the environment itself. A thorough discussion of this model, which translates
into the traditional notion of adaptation has been provided by Godfrey-Smith, cf. e.g.
[50, 51].
Figure 2.3: Illustration of three possible environment (”env”) - unit relationships: Tra-
ditionally, evolutionary units are seen as determined and shaped by their environment
(A). If feedback mechanisms between unit and environment are taken into account, a
situation of mutual dependence is obtained (B). If a clear distinction between unit and
environment is rejected as in DST, a self-referential ’unit’ is the consequence (C). For
details, refer to section 2.2.1.
Co-evolution of units and environment
The model of niche-construction has been introduce by R. Lewontin to emphasize the
interplay between environment and organism:
”... through niche construction organisms not only shape the nature of
their world, but also in part determine the selection pressures to which
they and their descendants are exposed.” [52, p. 117]
This notion of evolution incorporates feedback loops between unit and environ-
ment, as present e.g. in predator-prey scenarios. As a consequence, the shape of the
fitness landscape is no longer independent of the position of the organism on it. The
landscape changes while the organism travels on it, even though it remains unclear
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what type of change occurs. Metaphorically speaking, valleys may appear in place of
steep mountains, and summits may rise in the middle of low-lands. ’Walking uphill’,
i.e. changing oneself, is no longer enough; it is rather the environment that needs to
be manipulated such that the own current position on the fitness landscape becomes
an optimum. Prominent examples of such feedback mechanisms are all those species
which were to successful to survive, i.e. which affected their environment in such a
way that the resources needed for their own survival disappeared3. But also the current
situation of homo sapiens has to be characterized as rather changing the environment
than changing itself.
Indeed, we have to notice that the roles of environment and unit are interchangeable
in this picture (cf. subfigure B in 2.3): from the ’outside’, an observer is able to identify
two interacting components, but he or she can not tell which is the unit, and which is
the environment.
Developmental Systems
Based on the arguments in favor of a.) extra-genetic inheritance and b.) the presence
of a strong interdependency (feedback) between unit and environment, a central claim
of Developmental Systems Theory is obtained:
”Since we claim that there is no distinction between organism and environ-
ment, where do evolutionary pressures on the developmental system come
from? [...] everything that impinges on the process is an element of the
system itself. [...] all change in the system must be endogenously driven ...
” [38, p. 12]
As expressed in the above quote, the change over time of a Developmental System
can no longer be described as some sort of relation or interaction between unit and
environment. As a consequence, the central evolutionary function of the environment,
i.e. the selection of fit individuals, needs to be integrated into the Developmental Sys-
tem itself. It is no longer the environment, that decides which units are fit and which
are not; it is rather the DS itself. From a formal point of view, this may appear a bit
odd, given that DS are now supposed to carry out some sort of ’self-evaluation’. They
should, by themselves, exert evolutionary pressure on themselves. Thus, in a certain
sense, evolutions defines and solves exclusively its very own problems.
2.2.2 Reconstructing units
Claiming that there is no distinction between organism and environments is definitely
inspiring but, on the other hand, also posses a series of challenges. In figure 2.4, three
problems, which are clearly not independent from each other, are exemplarily depicted.
First, a naive person might want to know how to identify a DS as such when stand-
ing right in front of one. Or, may be even more illustrative, one might want to know
3According to J. Diamond, the population of the Easter Island apparently managed to reach this very
situation 3 centuries ago [53].
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how to tell that something is not (part of) a DS. In other words, defining something
without telling where it ends appears to be no definition at all. Thus, we would like to
know what is outside of a DS.
Second, we are apparently surrounded by more than just one single DS 4. Thus, it
would be nice to know where one DS begins and another one ends.
Third, can we tell something about the internal structure of DS? Stated in other
words, there are quite a few organisms resp. DSs, which exhibit an astonishing amount
of structure and organization within themselves. We feel that this fact should be ad-
dressed somehow by a general framework of evolution and development, as presum-
ably presented in Developmental Systems Theory.
Figure 2.4: Based on the claim of DST that there is no distinction between environment
and organism, a series of questions arise which are visualized in the above figures. (A)
What is outside of a DS? Are not we standing in need of some notion of the environment
of a DS? (B) There are, apparently, multiple DS. How can they be distinguished and
how are they related to each other? (C) Finally, what about the internal structure
of DS? Please note that this figure rather serves to illustrate a possible view on DS,
than to precisely define what problems may arise from DS theory. For details, refer to
section 2.2.2
The following paragraphs are dedicated to a discussion of these three difficulties:
namely the problem of the outside, of multiple DS and of the internal structure of
Developmental Systems. In a certain sense, all these difficulties seem to force us to
reconstruct Developmental Systems as units which are clearly separated from their
environment.
The environment of Developmental Systems
From a pragmatic-epistemologic point of view we have to ask ourselves: What have
we gained by replacing the traditional notion of an organism with the novel concept
of a Developmental System if we can not tell where it ends? A possible reply could
4J. E. Lovelock has pointed out that the whole biosphere could indeed be considered as one single
organism, taking its high level of interdependence and feedback into account (cf. [54]). However, in the
given context we will stick to a somewhat more common notion of biological units respectively DS, in
order to maintain the ability to view e.g. a dog or a cat as individual units.
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be that our previous notion of an organism was ’simply wrong’, as it was based on
an arbitrary distinction between unit (organism) and environment. In this sense, we
agree that the notion of a Developmental System is driven by valid arguments and thus,
it can indeed be considered as an improvement or as a gain. On the other hand, the
living world has lost its contours completely and became a rather homogeneous soup
of unlimited Developmental System(s). Apparently, we have lost an understanding of
the (living) world as a structured whole in which units and entities can be distinguished.
Furthermore, it appears difficult to empirically specify a DS, for not a single example
could be found in the literature reviewed by the author.
Furthermore, when considering the whole matrix of resources relevant to a DS, we
have to notice that some of these resources are more important than others. However,
the relevance of a resource is apparently no property of the resource itself, but rather
determined by the function it fulfills for respectively within the DS. Informally stated,
some resources are of vital importance to a DS, while other are completely irrelevant.
Odling-Smee (cf. e.g.[52]) incorporated this observation into his framework, and, con-
sequently, re-introduce the notion of organism-independent environment. More pre-
cisely, he assigned ...
”... separate roles to the environment of a particular lineage of organ-
isms and what he calls the ’universal physical environment’. The former,
organism-referent description of the environment is the source of evolu-
tionary pressures on that organism, and the organism is the source of
niche-constructing forces on that environment. The later, the universal
physical environment, is a source of exogenous change in the organism’s
environment.” [41, p. 205,206]
Thus, organism and organism-referent environment are interdependent, just as they
are in the concept of Developmental Systems. The universal physical environment,
in contrast, is independent of the organism while driving exogenous change. In this
scenario, the border between ’unit’ and ’environment’ is defined via the units ability
to modify the environment, i.e. the universal physical environment can not be changed
by the organism per definitionem. However, just as the organism-referent environment
depends upon the organism, one might claim that the relevance of an aspect of the
universal physical environment is organism-dependent too. Therefore, even though
an organism may not be able to (actively) change the universal physical environment,
it still can be able to ’decide’ upon the ’meaning’ of it: An increase in rainfall can
(presumably) not be changed by a tree, but if this increase is positive, negative or
simply completely irrelevant - ’invisible’ - for the tree is not a property of the rainfall
itself. Thus, assuming that the rainfall-increase is of no relevance for the trees well-
being, it can hardly be seen as the ’source of exogenous change’. More importantly,
the universal physical environment can apparently be a different one for each organism
resp. each DS. Consequently, within the universal physical environment, a visible (or
’relevant’) and a invisible (or ’irrelevant’) part can be distinguished. Both parts are
organism respectively DS dependent.
Finally, if no distinction between unit and environment is made, the fitness land-
scape behaves identical as in the case of co-evolution: it is reacting to the movements
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of the DS on it. In other words, the fitness of a DS is now completely dependent on
the position of the DS in morphospace. This may appear good news, but indeed, it
is not: without pressure, there is no change. At first sight, it remains unclear, why
such a system should change at all. And as we all know, biological systems do indeed
change. If we still want to claim that, during the course of evolution something is ’op-
timized’, we need to provide a radical new meaning for the term ’fitness’. At a first
glance, it may be tempting to replace ’fitness’ with ’overall energy’, as we know that
according to the second law of thermodynamics chemical systems will, by themselves,
eventually assume a low-energy equilibrium state. However, this sort of evolutionary
pressure would be an external one, as it precisely assigns, to each state of the DS, a
certain amount of ’energy’. In contrast to this, internal pressure can not be defined a
priori which means that the very assignment of energy (fitness,...) to specific states of
the system is impossible.
Stated in others words, the problem here is not that free living systems are far away
from a low-energy equilibrium state, and thus, their dynamic can not be understood
as driven by energy-minimization. The problem is rather that the definition of any
objective function, no matter if we label it fitness, energy or something else, appears to
be impossible without an environment providing an outside evaluation-criterion.
Thus, a boundary between unit and environment needs to be established, which
allows for external pressure. Furthermore, this boundary should not be based on the
criterion of ’complete independence’ between unit and environment, in order to avoid
the problems we saw above.
An interesting alternative approach to define the environment-unit boundary based
on the immune-response of an organism can be found in [55], but given that this cri-
terion is based on the presence of an immune system, it seems to transfer the problem
rather than solving it: instead of defining the unit, we now stand in need of defining
what an immune system is. In the case of primitive organism, this might be a rather
tedious task.
Distinguishing multiple Developmental Systems
First of all notice that, once we are talking about multiple DS, we implicitly accept the
notion of a DS-dependent environment. Trivially, for each DS, all the other DSs belong
to the environment. Consequently, if multiple Developmental Systems are considered,
the notion of differential fitness re-gains plausibility:
”According to Darwin’s theory, in a world in which there are interact-
ing entities with the properties of multiplication, heredity, and heritable
variation that affects the chances of multiplication, natural selection will
necessarily occur, ...” [56, p. 9]
This notion of fitness as the differing capacity of multiplication respectively repro-
duction appears to be problematic, given that the distinction between unit and non-unit
(i.e. environment) is, by itself, difficult. More specific, as a prerequisite of reproduc-
tion, there has to be some unit or entity that can be reproduced:
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”According to DST an evolutionary individual is one cycle of a complete
developmental process - a life cycle. [...] Developmental systems include
much that is outside the traditional phenotype. This raises the question
of where one developmental system and one life cycle ends and the next
begins.” [38, p. 14]
Note that, when discussing multiple DS, we may also be talking about parent and
offspring: as long as both rely on the same resource, their DSs are apparently ’overlap-
ping’. However, in order to talk about overlapping DS, we need a notion of the internal
structure of Developmental Systems.
The internal components of Developmental Systems
As we already know, Developmental Systems embrace the whole matrix of resources
need for their reconstruction. Thus, there is no single specific component which needs
to be present in any DS. Furthermore, if something is a resource for a given DS or
not is determined by the DS. In other words, ’being a resource’ is not a property, but
a relation between a component and the whole system. The whole system, in turn, is
exclusively constituted by its components and their interdependencies.
”Developmental systems theorists...define inheritance as the reliable re-
construction of interactive causal networks” [57, p.961]
Thus, the internal structure of DS can be understood as reproducing causal networks
among resources. Once more we can see the self-referential, emergent character of DS:
They are emergent insofar as they constitute the point-of-reference to decide upon
the relevance of resources. More precisely, they decide - metaphorically speaking -
if something constitutes a resource or not, if something is of any relevance to them
or not. Consequently, in this sense the distinction between system-relevant ’inside’
and system-irrelevant (’invisible’) outside is drawn by the system itself (cf. the notion
of system-referent environment in subsection 2.2.2). In this sense, DS are defining
themselves and emergence can be seen as the very act of self-defining.
On the other hand, DS are also self-referential insofar as the whole is constituted by
its parts, while its parts are constituted as such by the whole. Stated in other words, the
parts can not be identified as units (components, resources, ...) without the whole: they
do not exist as parts. I would like to emphasize this last point once more: in general,
it is easy to see that the whole is constituted by its parts: if some parts are missing, the
whole does not exist. In the context of DS, one would say that, if a vital resource is
missing, the affected DS will fail to reproduce and thus ’die out’. For what concerns
the relevance of the whole for its parts, it is less intuitive to say that they ’do not exist’
if the whole is not present. However, any living organism provides a nice example of
a systems whose parts - organs, tissues, cells - do not exist without the whole that they
constitute.
The difficulty in seeing an equivalence between [part→ whole: the parts imply the
whole] and [part ← whole: parts are implied by the whole] may be the direction of
determination. The relation between part and whole is typically seen as a hierarchical
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one. Furthermore, we are used to bottom-up causation and thus, to top-down reduc-
tions: explaining complex phenomenons by dissection into ever smaller and simpler
parts 5. However, in the current situation, both directions bottom-up and top-down,
are completely equivalent as they can not be distinguished: the parts are as much an
emergent phenomenon as the whole.
2.2.3 Structuring units
As we have seen in section 2.2.2 we stand in need of a boundary, a distinction between
unit and environment. We have noticed that the concept of Developmental Systems, as
long as it entails a ’union of environment and unit’, is rather incompatible with evo-
lution as optimization. We need an outside, thus we have to establish a conceptual
framework including this very difference between ’outside’ and ’inside’. Concerning
this distinction, we consider the notions of unit and environment and DS and environ-
ment to be equivalent.
Furthermore, we also saw that an internal structure of DS’s is needed to explain the
differences between multiple DSs. Within the following paragraphs, some approaches
focusing on the emergence of DS from causal interaction networks among resources
are presented.
Repeated assemblies and trait groups
According to DST an evolutionary unit is ’one cycle of a complete developmental
process - a life cycle’ [38, p. 14]. Following this definition, the main criteria of a DS
is its cyclic structure. Given that there is a wealth of cyclic phenomena and ’repeated
assemblies’ in nature, we apparently need to further specify what exact type of cycles
are DSs and which are not. A number of similar cells integrated into an organ or a
group of individuals forming a swarm are apparently repeated assemblies. However, we
claim that a notion of DSs which is incapable to distinguish these types of assemblies
from a traditional physiological individual would reflect a (too) wide notion of ”unit”.
Therefore, the question is
”... what makes a repeated assembly a developmental system in its own
right, as opposed to a part of such a system or an aggregate of several
different systems.” [38, p. 14]
In the above quote, the question how to distinguish a repeated assembly and a DS
is re-cast into the question of identifying the right level of granularity: defining a DS
(intermediate level) means distinguishing it from its environment (upper level) as well
as from its parts (lower level). This problem is well-known as the ’level of selection
problem’ (cf. [61, 62]), and in order to address it, Wilson and Sober (cf. [63, 61])
introduce the concept of a trait group. A trait group is ...
5For a discussion of possible concepts of top-down causation, as opposed to bottom-up causation,
refer to [58, 59], whereas the implications of a hierarchical model of the world are discussed in [60].
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”... a set of organisms relative to which some adaptation is, in economic
terms, a public good.” [38, p. 14]
The idea behind the concept of a trait group is to ask for whom a certain trait is
beneficial, and for whom it is not. Most importantly, some trait of an organism may
increase the fitness not only of the organism itself, but may also be beneficial for other
organisms too (cf. Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Each organism - A, B and C - consists of several components resp. traits,
which in turn are interdependent. Some specific trait X of an organism B may be
relevant for the fitness of this organism itself, but also for the fitness of other organisms
A and C. All organisms, for which a specific trait is beneficial, are forming the trait
group. If the fitness of these other organisms A and C is of relevance for B’s fitness,
the trait X in B may be selected not because of its direct contribution to B’s fitness, but
because of its indirect one. For details, refer to section 2.2.3
However, in order to characterize a trait group as an evolutionary unit, we need to
add some positive feedback on the fitness-level. Stated in other words, for a trait group
to become a unit of evolution, the relationship between the ’elements’ (e.g. organisms)
of a trait group needs to be mutually advantageous: For of each member of the group,
increasing the fitness of its group members is the most efficient way to (indirectly)
increase its own fitness. On a causal level, this sort of economic cooperation is realized
via the interaction among specific traits of the involved group members. Eventually,
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this sort of feedback leads to functional differentiation and the dependence of individual
elements on the whole group:
”Not every trait group is a superorganism. There are a number of features
that seem to mark the difference between mere trait groups and superor-
ganisms, such as the functional differentiation of parts and the dependence
of parts on the whole for their viability.” [38, p. 14]
As a consequence of cooperation and mutually advantageous interactions, competi-
tion between the components disappears. Thus, the individual components respectively
base-level evolutionary units are no longer competing for access to one and the same
limited resource, but rather identified each others as resources. However, as the amount
of economic cooperation present within a group of components can range from ’virtu-
ally non-existent’ to ’completely interdependent’, the distinction between a repeated
assembly, and a DS which originated from trait group selection is not a crisp one:
”We suggest, then, that a repeated assembly is a developmental system in
its own right, as opposed to a part of such a system or an aggregate of
several different systems when specific adaptations exist, presumably due
to trait group selection, which suppress competition between the separate
components of the assembly. This account of the evolution of individu-
ality can actually explain why the distinction between a colony of organ-
isms or a symbiotic association and an individual organism is not a sharp
one.” [38, p. 14]
Hence, according to this approach, evolutionary units are basically the result of
economical cooperation. It is easy to see that, once such an economically positive
feedback exists between a set of components, trait group selection is likely to increase
the level of (economical) interdependence. Thus, as a consequence, we have to assume
that Developmental Systems are highly integrated, i.e. they are formed by strongly
interdependent components. Also intuitively appealing, this notion of highly integrated
systems poses a serious problem to natural selection, as we will see in the following
section.
Modularity and gradualism
When thinking about a unit as opposed to the environment, the interdependence among
the unit’s components gains relevance: We can clearly see that an organism or parts
of it are interacting with elements of the environment. Nonetheless, the organism-
environment boundary is apparently established due to a somewhat stronger interaction
encountered among the parts of the organism. In the previous section, we saw an ap-
proach centered around ’mutually advantageous’ traits respectively components, which
attempts to explain how such a highly integrated system can emerge. The system to be
explained has been characterized by suppressed competition, functional differentiation
and dependence of parts on the whole for their viability.
In contrast to this, R. Lewontin observed that a tight integration of the organism’s
components may hinder evolution. He claimed that quasi-independence among the
parts is required for evolution through natural selection:
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”Quasi-independence means that there is a great variety of alternative
paths by which a given characteristic may change, so that some of them
will allow selection to act on the characteristic without altering other char-
acteristics of the organism in a countervailing fashion;” [31, p. 230]
If all traits of an organism are strongly interdependent, a small change in just one
of these traits may lead to a big change of the organisms overall fitness. Hence, a cer-
tain modular composition of the evolutionary unit, which allows for quasi-independent
modifications of the individual components, is required. Otherwise a gradual improve-
ment become impossible, because the situation - ’small change, big effect’ - actually
renders any systematic optimization procedure, including Natural Selection, infeasi-
ble. The fitness-landscape becomes a rugged mountain landscape full of pinnacles and
abysms. Traveling uphill is as impossible as finding a ’reasonably good’ local optima,
because there are too many of them. On such a landscape, random search is as effi-
cient as any other heuristic 6. Stated in other words, as a prerequisite for any heuristic,
including Natural Selection, the locality criteria (cf. e.g.[64]), sometimes also referred
to as the requirement for continuity (cf. [31, 65]) needs to be satisfied. This criteria
requires a certain correlation between the distances in morphospace and the differences
of the associated fitness-values. Thus, if very similar body-plans exhibit very different
fitnesses, the locality criteria is violated and natural selection becomes infeasible.
The notion of locality, as a formal requirement for any heuristic, needs to be dis-
tinguished from gradualism, as the assumption that changes in nature occur gradually,
continuously in small steps which accumulate over the course of time7. Without local-
ity, natural selection itself becomes infeasible and can no longer explain the course of
evolution, no matter if the later is seen as a gradual process or not. With locality, natu-
ral selection becomes feasible, but the feasibility of natural selection does not imply a
gradual, stepwise evolution.
Thus, the discussion about the gradual nature of morphological change, as opposed
to a punctuated equilibrium scenario (cf. Figure 2.6), has no implications what so
ever concerning the validity of natural selection as a cause of evolutionary change.
However, this discussion does have an impact on the shape of the fitness-landscapes, if
natural selection is seen as the sole source of morphological change:
• Phyletic Gradualism implies continuous evolutionary pressure which translates
into an intermediate inclination of those parts of the fitness-landscape, which are
relevant for the evolving species.
• In contrast to this, a Punctuated Equilibrium scenario, as proposed by Edredge
and Gould (cf. [67, 68]), reflects a mixture of evolutionary stable phases and
phases of rapid morphological change. Whereas the former (no morphological
6In computer science, a heuristic is any type of search strategy. Such search strategies, as Genetic
Algorithms e.g., are typically used to find good solutions for formally defined problems
7Even though the concept of gradualism may appear almost trivial today, it has played an impor-
tant role during the initial formulations of Natural Selection in the 19th century, as it implies that the
differences among species - including homo sapiens - are merely gradual ones [66].
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Figure 2.6: Phyletic gradualism assumes
that species are continuously chang-
ing over time, while the punctuated
equilibrium scenario proposes periods
without any alteration of biological
form, interrupted by sequences of rapid
morphological change. Both scenario
are consistent with the concept of nat-
ural selection, even though the fitness
landscape driving evolutionary change
will exhibit a different shape depending
on the chosen scenario. Figure obtained
from http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Punctuated_equilibrium . For
details, refer to section 2.2.3
change) translates into (plateaus of) local optima, the later (rapid morphological
change) corresponds to very steep inclinations.
As the final consequence, the notion of highly integrated units needs to be ques-
tioned: The principles of natural selection require a certain level of modularity, of
independence among the traits of an evolutionary unit.
Developmental constraints
One of the central dogmas of evolutionary biology is the correlation between func-
tionality and conservation. Nature selects for outcome, hence what we see in todays
nature exhibits a higher functionality than those species, features and genes which went
extinct. In particular, those aspects of biological form which are able to withstand evo-
lutionary pressure over prolonged periods of times have to be competitive. Otherwise,
they would have been replaced. Therefore, functionality implies conservation. Con-
versely, if some feature of an organism is highly conserved throughout the course of
evolution, it is assumed to be highly functional.
This very conclusion - conservation implies functionality - lies at the heart of nu-
merous present day research projects in molecular biology: given that ’functionality’
is a completely generic property, it can hardly be measured if the system under in-
vestigation is not yet thoroughly understood. Indeed, understanding the function of a
component of some system usually represent the final objective of an inquiry. In turn,
identifying conserved features merely requires a comparison of multiple evolutionarily
related systems and thus, is a convenient point to start from.
However, this procedure has been questioned, because...
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”...there are many highly conserved features of biological lineages that are
not plausibly explained by stabilizing selection.” [69, p. 8]
In more general terms, we need to question the extend of adaptive explanations.
Stated in other words, random variation and natural selection might be not enough
to explain every aspect of the living. For what concerns the ’conservation without
functionality’ situation described above, the concept of developmental constraints has
been proposed:
”A constraint can be defined fairly uncontentiously as a bias in the pro-
duction of variation in a population” [69, p. 8]
First of all it has to be noticed that a constraint is, by its very definition, opposed
to adaptation. Hence, as intended, it may serve as an explanation for conserved and
apparently non-functional features of an organism. Stated in other words, using the
concept of developmental constraints we are also able to provide an explanation for
cases of maladaptation.
However, in contrast to this notion of developmental constraints it has been argued
that ...
”... constraints can only ever be temporary, since evolution can recon-
struct the developmental system of the organism so as to achieve whatever
outcome is selectively optimal.” [69, p. 9]
From this adaptationist point of view, a developmental constraint is not opposed
to adaptation, but rather a mid-term result, which may turn out disadvantageous on the
long run.
Summarizing the above discussion on developmental constraints, the following as-
pects need to be emphasized: First of all we saw that functionality implies conservation,
but conservation does not necessarily imply functionality.
Second, the adequacy of the concept of ’developmental constraints’ to analyze evo-
lution can be questioned. Empirically, it is impossible to decide if there is a bias in the
production of variations in a population, i.e if a developmental constraint ’exists’. On a
purely conceptual level, however, we have to recognize that from an adaptationist point
of view, there can be no non-functional features and thus, there can be no developmen-
tal constraints (as something that constrains functionality) either. Conversely, claiming
that there actually are non-functional features, already requires some non-adaptationist
perspective. Thus, recurring to the existence of non-functional features can not be
used as an argument to support a non-adaptationist position. Likewise, ’functional-
ity’ is not an empirical category, but the assignment of a role in a readily available
model. Given that the concept of a ’developmental constraint’ is intimately related to
some notion of functionality, the difficulties originating from the former are suppos-
edly rooted in the later. More precisely, if ’functionality’ and ’adaptation’ are seen as
a deeply subject-dependent construction, the problems associated with ’developmental
constraints’ might be alleviated.
Finally, if we consider an organism as a system made up of different modules each
of which exhibits its own dynamics, evolution can be understood as a multi-objective
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optimization procedure. Once we acknowledge that there is more than one notion of
fitness, more than one notion of a unit upon which selection acts, the concept of devel-
opmental constraints is no longer needed.
2.3 Summary
The point of departure for Developmental Systems Theory is the rejection of a gene-
centered vision of inheritance. To support this view, a series of arguments have been
outlined (cf. section 2.1).
First of all, empirical evidence indicates that nude DNA can hardly be seen as an
autonomous inheritance system. Obviously, a set of additional resources is needed to
allow for self-sustained reproduction. A single DNA strand is not capable of repro-
duction, nor is there any organism which, at any point of its life cycle, exists as such.
The smallest unit during an organisms life cycle, which is traversed by all organisms,
is a single cell. But to allow for normal development, frequently a series of extra-
cellular resources needs to be present as well, not to mention parental care and further
resources generated by the enclosing population as a whole (cf. subsection 2.1.1). All
this resources, no matter if they are genetic, cellular, extra-cellular or provided by the
whole population, have to be seen as equally essential to the unfolding of an organ-
ism’s life-cycle, i.e. to its development. Hence, evolution and development have to be
studied in an integrated fashion, for an extended notion of inheritance also questions
the crisp dichotomy of ontogeny and phylogeny.
Furthermore, natural selection itself provides a second mayor argument in favor
of multiple, including non-genetic, inheritance systems (cf. subsection 2.1.2). Al-
ready the observation that Darwin formulated his theory without any notion of genetic
inheritance indicates that, for natural selection to work, the details of inheritance are
irrelevant. Indeed, from an evolutionary point of view, the only requirements for ’in-
heritance’ are a.) some resemblance between the units of a lineage, and b.) that this
resemblance concerns features (properties, characteristics, ...) which are relevant for
the unit’s fitness, i.e. for it’s reproductive success. Any mechanism which guarantees
that this requirements are satisfied has to be considered as an inheritance system.
However, some author agree on the existence of extra-genetic inheritance but try to
minimize their relevance (cf. subsection 2.1.3) by either claiming that a.) only genes
transmit information or b.) that only the genetic inheritance system has an unlimited
evolutionary potential. We rejected a.) by showing that using the concept of ’infor-
mation’ in the context of inheritance is problematic in general and b.) by pointing out
that also the genetic inheritance systems depends upon further, non-genetic inheritance
systems.
The first mayor conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion of multiple in-
heritance systems is the equivalence between defining a unit of evolution and defining a
mechanism of inheritance. Apparently, if we can identify a mechanism of inheritance,
we are also able to identify the units of evolution, for this very units are also the sub-
jects of inheritance. Characteristics or properties, which are either not inherited (not
passed on from one unit to the other), or which remain unchanged, can never become
subject to evolution. Consequently, if the mechanism of inheritance is presumed to be
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exclusively genetic, the only possibly unit of evolution has to be genetic as well. As
can be seen at R. Dawkins, a gene-centered vision of inheritance necessarily entails a
gene-centered vision of selection. However, the insight that the question ”what are the
units of evolution?” can be faithfully translated into the question ”what is the mecha-
nism of inheritance?” is of absolutely no use to answer either of the questions. In both
cases, a prior knowledge concerning the answer of one of the questions is required to
be able to address the other one. In order to define a mechanism of inheritance, we need
a prior notion of ’unit’ (e.g. organism, species, ...), while in order to define the units of
evolution, a prior understanding of the mechanism (e.g. genetic, cellular, cultural, ...)
is required.
Consequently, accepting the presence of extra-genetic inheritance entails a rejection
of gene-selectionism, but provides no further hints concerning a fruitful understanding
of ’evolutionary unit’ (cf. section 2.2). Indeed, defining a developmental system as
the whole matrix of resources needed to reliably reconstruct a casual network, i.e.
to complete one life cycle, may be consistent with natural selection, but apparently
lacks an applicable criterion to distinguish between system and environment. Given the
part-whole relationship between unit and ’required resources’, identifying the required
resources is impossible without a prior definition of the unit itself. Conversely, the unit
itself can not be identified as long as it’s parts (required resources) are not yet identified.
Thus, Developmental Systems theory seems to lead to a step-wise dissolution of the
boundary between unit and environment (cf. subsection 2.2.1). A transition can be
identified from the strict dependence of the unit from the environment to a scenario of
co-evolution of unit and environment. If the notion of interdependence underlying co-
evolution is taken seriously, the final dissolution of the system-environment boundary,
as present in a Developmental System, is the consequence.
However, there is a series of problems which can not be solved without a clear
distinction between system and environment (cf. subsection 2.2.2). First of all, natural
selection can not be understood as somewhat ’internal selection’, but clearly requires an
environment excerting evolutionary pressure on the unit. Furthermore, as selection is
related to (the unit’s) fitness, we also have to notice that fitness in this context can only
be defined as differential reproductive success. Apparently, the notion of reproduction
requires the notion of a unit which can be reproduced. Hence, the question remains
were to draw the distinction between unit and environment. This difficulty, also known
as the problem of the ’level of selection’, has been addressed various times, either
proposing genes (e.g. R. Dawkins), organism (e.g. C. Darwin) or species (e.g. K.
Lorenz).
In order to address this problem, a series of arguments focusing on the internal
structure of evolutionary units have been sketched (cf. subsection 2.2.3). In order
to distinguish between actual evolutionary units and mere ’repeated assemblies’, the
concept of trait groups has been proposed. A trait group is a group of traits (or com-
ponents, elements,...), for which a certain trait is, in economic terms, a public good.
Hence, the presence of this trait is in evolutionary terms advantageous for the corre-
sponding trait group. Now, assuming a multitude of trait groups, it is easy to imagine a
scenario of positive feedback among a set of traits. As a consequence of this feedback,
the evolutionary interdependence within this traits increases until they form a unit in
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it’s own right. Needless to mention that this model requires the pre-existence of some
evolutionary units in the first place, namely the traits upon which selection can act.
Hence it can not truly be seen as a model explaining the emergence of evolutionary
units, but merely their differentiation.
Furthermore, a relative independence (called ’quasi-independence’ by R. Lewon-
tin) among the traits of an evolutionary unit, i.e. a modular structure, was identified
as a prerequisite for natural selection. Without such a structure, a continuous improve-
ment is impossible as the fitness-landscape lacks the smoothness needed for stepwise
optimization. Finally, the notion of a developmental constraint as a cause of mal-
adaptation has been outlined and rejected, for extinction is seen as the only reasonable
criterion to identify cases of mal-adaptation. Hence, the suitability of this concept to
define evolutionary units seems to be limited.
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Chapter 3
STUART KAUFFMAN
Stuart Kauffman is probably best known for claiming that natural selection just by
itself is insufficient to explain life. Self-organization has to be assumed as an additional
principle, which is not only involved into the emergence of life as an historical event,
but which is also constantly present in all of todays life forms. In order to support this
view, Kauffman heavily relies on formal models and computer simulations. Thus, he
tries to provide a mechanistic explanation for life, i.e. he sketches a mechanism (model,
simulation) capable of generating the phenomenon to be explained (life).
However, in order to truly appreciate the proposed explanation, an explicit state-
ment of the question to be addressed is needed. Thus, in a first step, we will try to
outline Kauffman’s notion of the phenomenon to be explained (cf. section 3.1). When
doing so, we have to keep in mind that the phenomenon to be explained is not, roughly
stated, ’life itself’, but only those aspects and characteristics of living units which can
presumably not be explained by natural selection. Thus, we are not only trying to out-
line those aspects of life which seem to require an explanation, but also to delineate the
explanatory limits of natural selection. The first thing to notice during this endeavor
is the apparent improbability of life (cf. subsection 3.1.1), if life is seen as a closed
thermodynamic system. Hence we seek a model which makes the emergence of living
units not only possible, but also probable. For what concerns this very emergence of
living units, Kauffman proposes a holistic view (cf. subsection 3.1.2), i.e. he claims
that we seek a model which explains the origin of life as a one-step process. Finally,
in subsection 3.1.3, we recapitulate Kauffman’s observation that there seems to be a
certain minimal complexity for living units below which life is impossible.
After summarizing the obtain problem description (cf. section 3.2), the models
employed by Kauffman to address this problem(s) are outlined in the following sub-
sections. In subsection 3.2.1, the theory of autocatalytic sets and a more recent ex-
tension of it (Graded Autocatalytic Replication Domains - GARD) is presented. This
models primarily address the emergence of living units. In subsection 3.2.2 Boolean
NK-Networks are outlined, and their suitability to formalize the notions of ’stability’
and ’variability’ of living units is discussed. Finally, in subsection 3.2.3, the modular-
ity of units in relation to the fitness landscape is examined using an adjusted Boolean
Network model.
We will conclude this chapter with a summary of the central results in section 3.3.
3.1 Natural selection and self-organization
One of the central claims of Stuart Kauffmann is his rejection of natural selection as
the sole source of order. Instead, he proposes self-organization as an additional driving
force in evolution:
Figure 3.1: Illustration of the ’Question-Answer Model’: in order to evaluate the suit-
ability of an answer (solution), the question (problem) needs to be formulated explicitly.
Hence, in a first step we will outline Kauffman’s notion of ’life’ before discussing, in a
second step, his understanding of self-organization. Note that the later includes clar-
ifying the relation between natural selection and self-organization. Clearly, as can be
seen in the above figure, question and answer are always interdependent: proposing a
solution necessarily includes defining the problem. For details, refer to section 3.1
”Since Darwin, we turn to a single, singular force, Natural Selection, [...].
Without it, we reason, there would be nothing but incoherent disorder. [...]
I shall argue in this book that this idea is wrong. [...] Laws of complexity
spontaneously generate much of the order of the natural world. It is only
then that selection comes into play, further molding and refining. [...] this
emergent order underlies not only the origin of life itself, but much of the
order seen in organisms today. ” [70, p. 8]
As expressed in the above lines, the laws of complexity and self-organization are
in a certain sense prior to natural selection, which is designated as a merely ’refining’
force. However, self-organization is not seen as a single historical event, but rather
as a specific process which is continuously present in all of yesterdays, todays and
tomorrows life forms.
In order to fully appreciate role and relevance of self-organization, a more specific
description of Kauffman’s explanandum - life - is needed (cf. Figure 3.1)
Stuart Kauffman sees order as the central aspect of life, which needs to be ex-
plained. In this context, the key characteristic of order is its inherent improbability.
Would order be something which is very likely to appear, something that we expect
to arise ’naturally’, then there were no reason for us to seek an explanation for it. The
expected needs not be explained. Thus, in a first step we will outline in which sense life
is ordered, and in which sense this order appears to be improbable (subsection 3.1.1).
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Another aspect of life which is typically seen as non-explicable by means of natural
selection is its beginning. Apparently, natural selection explains how life evolves, but
fails to explain how it emerged from the non-living. The problem seems to be rooted
in the absence of evolvable units upon which natural selection can act. Consequently,
the main question around which current research is centered concerns the formation of
conditions which allow natural selection to take place. In subsection 3.1.2, a very brief
look at two theories is provided.
Finally, Kauffman points out that even the simplest free living organism today ex-
hibits an astonishing level of molecular organization. Based on this observation, he
claims that there is a certain minimal complexity, below which life as such can not
exist. In subsection 3.1.3, this position and its main implications are sketched.
3.1.1 The improbability of order: dissipative systems
The second law of thermodynamics states that in closed physical systems differences,
e.g. in temperature or chemical concentration, will eventually disappear (cf. e.g. E.
Schro¨dinger’s explanation in [71]). This decrease of differences is equivalent to an
increase in entropy, which can be considered as a measure of the amount of disorder
present in a closed system. A familiar - even though physically not truly correct -
example of such a closed system would be a cup of hot coffee with some cold milk in
it. As we know, the drop of milk does not remain in a precisely defined area of the
cup, clearly separated from the coffee. They mix up to form what is known as ’cafe
latte’ and, eventually, will exhibit the same temperature. Thus, the second law does
not state that closed physical systems will eventually assume a low-energy state. This
is impossible due to the first law of thermodynamics (energy conservation). It rather
states that for purely statistical reasons, in a closed equilibrium system, ordered states
are rather improbable:
”The consequence of the second law [of thermodynamics] is that in equi-
librium systems, order - the most unlikely of the arrangements - tends to
disappear. If order is defined as those coarse-grained states that corre-
spond to only a few fine-grained states [...], then at thermodynamic equi-
librium, those delicate arrangements disappear because of the ergodic
wandering of the system through all its microstates.” [70, p. 9,10]
Given that life is considered to be a highly ordered phenomenon typically exhibiting
a variety of differences with respect to temperature, chemical potential and pressure, it
seems to be contradicted by the second law of thermodynamics. Stated in other words,
if life is considered as a closed equilibrium system, the second law of thermodynamics
is applicable which in turn renders the ordered character of life highly improbable.
One of the first approach addressing the improbability of life while rejecting reli-
gious explanations was focused on time:
”The important point is that since the origin of life belongs in the category
of at least once phenomena, time is on its side. However improbable we
regard this event, or any of the steps which it involves, given enough time
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it will almost certainly happen at-least-once. And for life as we know
it, with its capacity for growth and reproduction, once may be enough.
[...] Given so much time, the ”impossible” becomes possible, the possible
probable, and the probable virtually certain. One has only to wait: time
itself performs the miracles.” [72, p. 48]
However, even though the chances of success clearly increase if we are given more
than one chance, the chances of success for one single attempt still need to be known
before ”the impossible becomes possible”. Stated in other words, knowing that we can
throw the dice a hundred times is not yet enough to claim that we will ’certainly’ ob-
tain a six at least once. We also need to know the chances to obtain a six in one single
throw. Transfered to our question, we need an estimate of the odds to obtain, by chance,
a primitive organism like e.g. E. coli. Such an estimate was proposed by Hoyle and
Wickramasinghe, based on the chances of a random assembly of a number of func-
tioning enzymes. The resulting probabilities are so incredibly low, that ”even in the
lifespan of the universe”, the spontaneous assembly of life is still virtually impossible.
Stated in Hoyles own words:
”The chance that higher life forms might have emerged in this way is com-
parable to the chance that a tornado sweeping through a junkyard might
assemble a Boeing 747 from the materials therein.”[73]
Confronted with this conclusion, some people claim that intelligent design is the
only answer. Others, like Kauffman, conclude that there must be something wrong
with the conclusion: We are alive, hence, life can not be impossible. Consequently,
the second law of thermodynamics may not be applied in the case of living systems.
Hence, living systems do not represent closed equilibrium systems.
Instead, Kauffman characterizes living systems as open, nonequilibrium systems,
which continuously dissipate matter and energy. However, even though this notion of
life as a dissipative system alleviates the problems associated with the second law of
thermodynamics, it still does not explain how dissipative systems emerge. In particular,
our notion of life as highly ordered system remains untouched.
3.1.2 The origin of life
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, theories concerning the origin of life are trying to close the
gap between a ’primordial soup’ and the first protocell. Before going into the details, it
is worth mentioning that the process we are trying to understand exhibits the following
two characteristics:
a.) It can no longer be observed: apparently, the transition from non-living matter
to living organisms is no longer taking place in nature, at least not on our planet.
b.) It may have occurred just once: for all we know, there is just one single common
ancestor to all of todays (and yesterdays) life forms. Even though we may spec-
ulate that there were multiple pre-biotic (semi-biotic) ’species’, just one of them
actually became the founder of todays life.
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Figure 3.2: (A) The
”biopolymer first”
scenario, according to
which the emergence of
self-replicating infor-
mational strings such as
RNA and proteins are
assumed to have had an
independent origin from
that of lipid encapsu-
lation. (B) The ”lipid
world” scenario, which
maintains that the roots
of life could have been
aggregates of spon-
taneously assembling
lipid-like molecules ca-
pable of compositional
inheritance. Taken from
[74]. For details, refer
to section 3.1.2
From a gene-centric point of view (cf. section 2.1) DNA is seen as the ultimate
unit of evolution, and thus, the main problem to be addressed is the origin of DNA-
replication. Without replication, natural selection can not occur. Regrettably, DNA-
replication is a quite complicated mechanism, and thus, simpler scenarios have been
sought. Obviously, the most simple DNA-replication scenario would be a scenario
involving exclusively DNA, and no other molecules. Ideally, DNA would catalyze
the formation of DNA. Regrettably, this is not the case, but RNA - an almost identi-
cal molecule - indeed is capable of enzymatic activity. This type of RNA is known
as ribozymes respectively catalytic RNA. Thus, a scenario of self-replicating RNA-
molecules seems to be a feasible candidate. However, macro-molecules like DNA or
RNA are very unstable and can only persist under a narrow range of chemical condi-
tions. A protective vesicle is needed, whose evolution - what ever it may be - appears
to be completely separated from that of RNA-replication. This ’mainstream’ view on
the origin of life can also be called the ”biopolymer first” scenario, as it concentrates
on mechanisms for the replication of complex biopolymers like RNA (cf. Figure 3.2).
Faced with this difficulties, the ”lipid world” scenario has been proposed:
”One is compelled to consider an alternative: that self-replication has
never been a property of individual molecules, but rather one of molec-
ular ensembles. [...] The crucial enigma seems to be related to self-
organization and the self-reproduction of supra-molecular structures ...”
[74, p. 217,218]
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Thus, instead of concentrating on the replication of complex, individual molecules,
the afore mentioned protective vesicle entered center stage as a primitive, supramolec-
ular unit. Such a vesicle could be obtained from a self-organizing process of lipid-like
amphiphiles, i.e. molecules with lipophylic tails and hydrophilic head groups. In an
aqueous solution, the hydrophilic heads are likely to align on the ’outside’, while the
hydrophobic tails tend to point to the ’inside’.
Apart from vesicle formation, the second key-concept of this ’lipid-world’ scenario
is that of compositional self-replication: if a mutually catalytic set of molecules under-
goes a random split, we can expect that the resulting (two or more) sets of molecules
will exhibit similar chemical concentrations as the parent assembly (cf. subsection
3.2.1 on GARD). For example, imagine a cocktail of different chemicals. If a suffi-
ciently large sample is taken from that cocktail, it will reflect more or less faithfully the
composition of the cocktail itself. Compared to the mechanism needed to duplicate a
molecule comprising approximately 4-billion base-pairs (human DNA), replication and
inheritance seems to become almost trivial in the case of a ’compositional genome’.
Now, assuming a sufficient diversity of such assemblies, natural selection can take
place allowing for a gradual evolution.
”The crucial origin of life question then becomes how natural selection
was initiated by some molecular assortments, irrespective of their exact
chemistry. [...] protocellular assemblies [...] could have constituted the
first systems capable of information storage, inheritance and selection.”
[74, p. 217,219]
Summarizing, we can see that the key problem that needs to be addressed, is the
formation of a supra-molecular structure, i.e. a unit, capable of inheritance and thus,
of evolution through natural selection. The mechanism which leads to such a unit is
required to be independent of the presence or absences of specific chemicals.
3.1.3 Minimal complexity
In the previous subsection 3.1.2, the idea was introduced that self-replication never was
a property of individual molecules, but rather of molecular assemblies. Supporting this
holistic approach is Kauffman’s notion of a minimal complexity:
”... all living things seem to have a minimal complexity below which it is
impossible to go.”[70, p. 42]
”Life emerged, I suggest, not simple, but complex and whole.”[70, p. 47 et
seq.]
As a possible candidate for the simplest free-living organism, the bacterium My-
coplasma pneumoniae has been proposed1. It has been characterized as ”a blueprint
1Kauffman himself proposed ”Pleuromona, a highly simplified bacterium”[70, p.42] as the simplest
free-living cell. As this organism is unknown to the NCBI taxonomy, probably because the name is
outdated, I have chosen to use M. Pneumoniae to illustrate his point.
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of the minimal cellular machinery required for life”[75, p. 1235] and is illustrated in
Figure 3.3. Its genome comprises 816,394 nucleotides, containing 689 protein-coding
genes, not to mention all types of no-coding mRNA and the whole machinery needed
for transcription and protein synthesis. It is further endowed with a fully functional
metabolism and a complex cell membrane allowing for a controlled interaction with
it’s environment. Naturally, this bacterium is capable of DNA-replication and cell divi-
sion - otherwise, it would not be alive. Clearly, discussion are possible about the exact
meaning of ’simple’ in this context, but it seems to be obvious that ”there is no such a
thing as a simple bacterium”[76, p. 1201].
Indeed, there are ’simpler’ organism than M. pneumoniae, like the insect symbiont
Hodgkinia cicadicola known for its small genome ([76, p. 1201]), or host-dependent
bacteria. Furthermore, viruses in general are magnitudes ’simpler’ than any bacterium,
but all these life forms can hardly be seen as free-living, independent organism. Hence,
they provide poor models for an ancestor organism that emerged from the primordial
soup. Furthermore, note that ’small’ or ’simple’ e.g. in term of genome size does not
correspond to old in evolutionary terms. In contrast, the low redundancy of very re-
duced bacteria and viruses probably represent the result of an evolutionary optimization
process, and not the ’point of departure’ for evolution.
Clearly, discussions are possible concerning a.) the exact meaning of free-living
and b.) what measurement to use to identify the simplest free-living organism. But
independent of the outcome of such a discussion, the main point here seems to be
beyond doubt: what ever organism we choose to be the most simple, free-living one, it
will be a supra-molecular structure (unit) of astonishing complexity.
As a first immediate consequence of this holistic notion of a minimal complexity
follows a non-gradual, non-continuous account of the origin of life. Second, as a con-
cluding observation on this issue, we would like to briefly mention the idea that only
a rather elevated complexity allows for adaptability. Stated in other words, complexity
can be seen as a requirement for adaptability.
3.2 Formal models and simulations
After the discussion of the previous section, we are now able to provide a more precise
description of the problem we seek to solve. Furthermore, we can also formulate a
series of requirements that possible answers have to fulfill:
1. How is the emergence of ordered, dissipative systems not only possible, but prob-
able (cf. subsection 3.1.1)?
2. We assume that this emergence was a single-step event, and not a gradual evolu-
tion (cf. subsection 3.1.3).
3. The resulting dissipative system needs to be capable of evolution through natural
selection, i.e. it needs to exhibit the following properties (cf. Figure 3.4):
(a) a supra-molecular unit (cf. subsection 3.1.2)
(b) capable of reproduction (cf. subsection 3.1.2)
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of M. pneumoniae. Even without going into the details of it’s
main components and their interplay, it becomes clear that this example of one of the
most ’simple’ free-living cells is anything but simple. Please not that also it’s basic
components as e.g. RNA polymerase represent extremely complex biopolymers, which
are never found outside a living organism. Taken from [75, p. 1238]. For details, refer
to section 3.1.3
(c) with a certain amount of stability and variability (cf. subsection 3.1.2)
(d) which is modular such that a gradual evolution becomes feasible (cf. sub-
subsection 2.2.3).
Furthermore, we have seen that a compositional genome might be a suitable model
for reproducing units (cf. subsection 3.1.2). Likewise, we suspect that variability re-
quires a certain amount of complexity, thus supporting our notion of emergence as a
single-step event (cf. subsection 3.1.3).
In the following subsections, we will have a look at a series of models trying to
address one or more of the above issues. The theory of autocatalytic sets, as outlined
in subsection 3.2.1 aims at providing an answer to question number 1. and 2., while
the GARD model (ibid.) also provides hints on how a primitive form of reproduction
and inheritance (question 3.b) might be feasible. Using boolean networks, the notion
of stability and variability can be given a rather straightforward interpretation (cf. sub-
section 3.2.2). Finally, question 3.d concerning the relation between gradualism and
modularity can be approached using a model which integrates this two properties (cf.
subsection 3.2.3).
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Figure 3.4: According to Stuart Kauffman, self-organization creates and maintains the
conditions which are required for natural selection to take place. Thus, as illustrated
above, evolution through natural selection is embedded in self-organization. As shown
on the left hand side, self-organization aims to provide an answer to the question how
multiple, relatively stable, self-replicating units emerge and thus enable natural se-
lection. In this context, positive feedback or self-reference is seen as one of the core
mechanisms of self-organization. For details, refer to section 3.2
3.2.1 Emerging units: autocatalytic sets
Kauffman proposes the model of collectively autocatalytic sets as an answer to the
question, how stable supra-molecular structures could have emerged in a single step. To
begin with, imagine a set of chemicals, that are reacting with each others, thus forming
novel chemicals, but also changing the concentration of those chemicals which were
already present. We can represent such a set of inter-reacting chemicals as a network:
each node of the network represents a specific chemical, while the weight (thickness)
of the directed edges between chemicals represents the corresponding rate constant,
i.e. the speed at which one chemical is transformed into the other one. Some reactions
involve more than just two chemicals, i.e. they are not of the form A → B but rather
A + B→ C or A + B + C → D. As can be seen, the more reactions are taking place, the
higher the expected chemical diversity, and the higher the chemical diversity, the more
reactions are becoming feasible. At this point, the notion of catalysis is introduced: if a
chemical is a catalyst to some reaction, it speeds up this very reaction. Thus, catalysis
increases the rate constant of the catalyzed reaction and thus accelerated the formation
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Figure 3.5: Two types of food molecules (’A’ and ’B’) are reacting to form the
molecules ’AB’ and ’BA’. The reaction itself is shown as a red diamond. Both ’AB’
and ’BA’ have a catalytic effect on the formation of each other (shown as dotted red
arrows). Hence, ’AB’ and ’BA’ form a (minimal) autocatalytic set. The achieved cat-
alytic closure, i.e. the proposed supra-molecular unit, is symbolized by a dotted circle.
For details, refer to section 3.2.1
of the reaction product. Now, if two or more chemicals are mutually catalytic, they
speed up each others formation. Hence, mutual catalysis represents a case of positive
feedback (cf. Figure 3.5). One of the most important aspects to notice is that, from
a chemical point of view, such a system of mutually catalytic chemicals can deviate
significantly from the initially expected equilibrium state, following its own, internal
dynamics.
Not all members (chemicals) of such a reaction network need to be part of the
autocatalytic set. Indeed, the key aspect of this model is that, if the reaction network
is ’big enough’, a subset of chemicals, which achieves catalytic closure, is very likely
to emerge. Stated in other words, the probability of catalytic closure depends on two
parameters:
”... [A] an increase in either the diversity of molecules or [B] the probabil-
ity that any molecule catalyzes any reaction.”[70, p. 64] ”Simpler systems
simply do not achieve catalytic closure.”[70, p. 69]
Ad [A]: Clearly, the higher the diversity of molecules, of involved chemicals, the
more reactions are feasible. Thus, the chances that some of these reactions are cat-
alyzed by some molecules increases and consequently, the emergence of positive feed-
back loops gains probability too.
Ad [B]: If the chances that any molecule catalyzes any reaction increase, so do
the chances that a set of molecules is mutually catalytic. Note that the probability to
achieve catalytic closure increases exponential in both parameters, which implies that
a phase transition can be expected, if these parameters are changed: While a simple
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chemical soup will hardly allow for autocatalytic sets, catalytic closure suddenly be-
comes highly probable if the primordial soup reaches a certain minimal diversity and
/ or a minimal level of catalytic interdependence. Indeed, Kauffman claims that in a
sufficient complex chemical soup, ”The emergence of autocatalytic sets is almost in-
evitable”[70, p. 61]. This clearly matches the previously introduced requirement for a
minimal complexity:
”Simpler systems simply do not achieve catalytic closure. Life emerged
whole, not piecemeal, and has remained so. [...] we have a hope of ex-
plaining why living creatures seem to have a minimal complexity ...”[70,
p. 69]
As another advantageous aspect of this model, he points out that the mechanism
underlying autocatalytic sets is independent of any specific chemistry, but rather de-
pends upon mathematical properties. On the one hand, this independence can be seen
as an advantage, given that no problematic assumption concerning the ingredients of
the primordial soups need to be made. On the other hand, when using a mathematical
model for a chemical process, it has to be guaranteed that the model actually ’repre-
sents’ the process it is supposed to ’represent’. Given that, for what concerns the origin
of life, the process itself is unknown to us, establishing such a correspondence between
model and process-to-be-modeled is difficult:
”... the particular details of the chemistry may not matter. We will be show-
ing that the spontaneous emergence of self-sustaining webs is so natural
and robust that it is even deeper than the specific chemistry that happens
to exist on earth; it is rooted in mathematics itself.”[70, p. 60]
A more recent application of these ideas can be found in the Graded Autocatalytic
Replication Domain - GARD (cf. e.g. [78, 79, 80]). In this model, the basic ideas
of autocatalytic sets has remained unchanged, while introducing some slight modifica-
tions which allow for evolution through natural selection. Thus, the primary objective
of the GARD model is not to show that catalytic closure is very likely to emerge un-
der certain chemical conditions, but to show how mutual catalysis can be achieved by
different sets of chemicals. Such a diversity of units is one of the primary require-
ments for natural selection. More precisely, for each GARD (cf. Figure 3.6), a certain
amount of randomly assigned catalytic relations among the involved chemcials is as-
sumed. As a consequence of this random assignment, catalysis will be of different
efficacy in different domains (GARDomains), i.e. the different GARD systems are
graded (GradedARD) according to their catalytic success and according to their chem-
ical composition. Assuming that a GARD will split in two GARDS once a certain
maximal number of molecules is reached, catalytic efficacy can be directly linked to
reproductive success. Ultimately, this success depends upon the combination of chem-
icals (dimers) present in the replication domain in specific concentrations, i.e. on the
GARD’s compositional genome. An illustration of this different concentration levels,
i.e. of different compositional genomes, can be seen in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.6: The GARD model of an auto-
catalytic set. As can be seen on the top, the
basic chemical reaction is the formation of
dimers (Di j) from monomers (Mi,M j), to-
gether with their corresponding rate con-
stants (k). This rate constants may be
changed through catalysis (βu,v). All chem-
icals are enclosed in a flexible membrane,
which is to a certain extent permeable for
monomers (’food molecules’), but not for
dimers. Thus, if the number of dimers in-
creases, the vesicle will expand and eventu-
ally split into two novel vesicles. The novel
vesicles will exhibit similar concentrations
of dimers as the parent vesicle. Thus, the
abundance levels of dimers represents a
compositional genome. From [77]. For
details, refer to section 3.2.1
Figure 3.7: Compositional genomes
in three different GARDs. Each
GARD consists of 100 different chem-
ical compounds, which may exert a
certain catalytic effect on the forma-
tion of other compounds. In the right
column, the strength of this force is
visualized as the thickness of an edge
linking the compounds, which are ar-
ranged in a circle. In the left column,
the resulting compositional genomes
are shown as the profile of concen-
trations: on the abscissa, the com-
pounds (1 − 100) are listed, while the
ordinate measures the obtained con-
centration. From [81]. For details,
refer to section 3.2.1
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Finally, note that the concept of a compositional genome illustrates that the distinc-
tion between (information coding) genotype and (information executing) phenotype
can be omitted. As observed by Kauffman, this is aspect is not only typical for the
GARD system, but for autocatalytic sets in general:
”With autocatalytic sets, there is no separation between genotype and phe-
notype.”[70, p. 73]
The structure itself, or, stated in more general terms, the organization of the sys-
tem itself represents its ’blueprint’. Thus, the challenge of inheritance is to reproduce
this very structure respectively organization, and no matter how this challenge is ad-
dressed, the use of ’information talk’ in this context seems to be not only problematic
(cf. section 2.1.3), but also unnecessary.
3.2.2 Stable units: attractors and state cycles
As mentioned before (cf. subsection 3.1.2), a certain level of stability is a requirement
for evolution by natural selection:
”To engage in the Darwinian saga, a living system must be able to strike an
internal compromise between maleability and stability.”[70, p. 73] ”How-
ever life started, with nude replicating RNA molecules or with collectively
autocatalytic set, this stability cannot be imposed from outside by natural
selection. It must arise from within as a condition of evolution itself.”[70,
p. 80]
In order to find hints on how living systems achieve stability, Kauffman analyzes
the behavior of Random Boolean Networks (cf. e.g. [82] for an introduction). As
pointed out by Kauffman ([83]), such networks can be used to model gene regulation
and are still in use for this very objective today (cf. e.g [84, 85]). Given that in most
multi-cellular organisms most cells contain the same set of genetic instructions, i.e. of
DNA, the question arises how the formation of different cell types during development
is achieved. Stated in other words, on the way from the fertilized zygote to the adult
organism, a variety of specialized tissues, as diverse as nerve cells, bones and skin,
is developed2. Given that each of these cell types holds the same set of genes, it is
assumed that the phenotypic differences are accounted for by regulatory differences,
i.e. differences in gene activity. As a matter of fact, in a nerve cell other genes are ’on’
than in the intestinal epithelium. Furthermore, gene products (protein or mRNA) of one
gene may have a regulatory impact on the activity of another gene, i.e. the activity of
gene A may change (increase or inhibit) the activity of gene B. Apart from the ongoing
popularity of Boolean Networks as a means to model such regulatory networks, they
are also suitable to examine the behavior, e.g. ’stability’ and ’variability’, of dynamical
systems in general.
In general, Boolean Networks consist of a set of N binary variables, {x1, x2, ..., xn},
and thus, the number of possible states (e.g. x1 = 0, x2 = 1, ..., xn = 0) for such a
2In homo sapiens, approximately 260 different tissues can be identified [35, p. 392 et seq.].
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Figure 3.8: A.) Example for a Boolean Network comprising three variables (A,B,C),
each of which is determined by the states of the other two variables. Combining the
three individual (local) transition rules yields a global rule, describing the transition
of the whole system from one state (T) to the next (T + 1). This rule can be written
as a table (top right). B.) Based on the global transition rule, the system’s trajectories
through states space can be illustrated as a state transition graph. Three attractors of
differing size can be identified, with 111 being the only stable attractor with a basin of
attraction. For details, refer to section 3.2.2
network is 2n. For each variable, a transition rule from state t to state t + 1 is defined.
This rule can be seen as a boolean function defined on (possibly) all variables of the
network (e.g. x1 = x1 ∧ x2 ∨ ... ∧ xn or f (x1, x2, ..., xn) 7→ x1) and thus, is a mapping
from 2n to {0, 1}: 2n 7→ {0, 1}. Naturally, a transition may be based on a subset of
variables too, e.g x1 = x1 ∧ x2 or simply x1 = x2. Taking all the individual transition
rules together, the global transition rule is obtained, i.e for each of the 2n states of
the network, the consecutive state at t + 1 is defined: f (x1, x2, ..., xn) 7→ {x1, x2, ..., xn},
2n 7→ 2n. In the upper part of Figure 3.8, a network of 3 variables (i.e. N = 3), it’s
individual transition rules and the global transition rule have been sketched.
Applying the global transition rule, for each possible state of the network the con-
secutive state can be determined. In order to illustrate the behavior of the system, a
state transition graph, as shown in the lower part of figure 3.8, can be used. For each
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Figure 3.9: On the left hand side, the complete state space of a boolean network with
N = 13 (i.e. 4192 states) is shown, each of which flows into one of 15 attractors. The
attractor marked with an arrow is shown in more detail on the right hand side. As can
be seen, some state have no precursor states (”garden-of-eden states”) and the vast
majority of states is only transient, forming tree-like structure which make up the basin
of attraction for the attractor cycle. From [84]. For details, refer to section 3.2.2
possible state of the network, a node is drawn. Given that each state leads to exactly
one following state (possibly itself), a directed edge can be used to designate state
transition.
Examining the properties of such a state transition graph, we find that, not matter in
which state the system is started, it will necessarily end up circling around in a number
of states. This circle may exhibit very differing lengths, either consisting of just one
single state, repeating itself over and over again, or comprising the entire state space
of the system. Furthermore, multiple such attractors may exist in a single Boolean
Network (cf. Figure 3.9). Thus, an examination of the state transition graphs yields
information on the system’s behavior in terms of i.) how many attractors are there,
ii.) what cycle lengths they have got and iii.) what sizes their corresponding basins of
attraction have.
Now, equipped with the knowledge of Boolean Networks and their behavior, we
can return to our initial question concerning the ”compromise between maleability and
stability” each living system has to strike. Using our notion of attractors in Boolean
Networks, we can clearly see that such an attractor suits our notion of stability: per-
turbing a system only slightly, such that it does not leave its current basin of attraction,
will not have a catastrophic impact on the systems behavior. In general, a slight mod-
ification will not send the system into a completely different region of its state space,
but rather will cause an only temporary deviation from its current attractor. Without
further perturbation from the outside, the system will stabilize itself again. However,
if the amount of external perturbation surpasses a certain threshold, the system may be
pushed into a different basin of attraction.
Thus, we can indeed provide a meaningful interpretation of stability and variability
exploiting the concepts of attractors, state cycles and, in particular, basins of attrac-
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Figure 3.10: Two extreme state transition graphs, for a Boolean Network with N = 4
nodes and 16 different states. On the left hand side, a maximum number of ’attractors’,
each comprising one single state, is shown. On the right hand side, a system with
one single attractor (0101), who drains the whole state space, is depicted. While in
the first case, no stability to perturbations is given, in the second case, no flexibility
(adaptability) can be observed. For details, refer to section 3.2.2
tion3.
However, it is crucial to notice that such a reasonable interpretation of stability re-
quires a specific structure of the state transition graph. Apparently, the following two
extreme examples of state transition graphs do not match our intuition of a stable yet
flexible system (cf. Figure 3.10): If there are either too much attractors or too few
ones, the system is either very sensitive to small changes (i.e. unstable or chaotic), or
does not respond to perturbations at all (i.e. inflexible or ordered). Thus, the key ques-
tion is: what makes the difference between a ’good’ network, exhibiting the desired
mixture of stable yet flexible behavior, and a ’bad’ network? What parameters can be
used to characterized those Boolean Networks which are flexible yet stable? Stated in
Kauffmans own words:
”From a biological perspective, the most interesting networks lie at or
near a critical point in parameter space that divides ordered from chaotic
attractor dynamics.”[86, p.68] ”The transition from the ordered regime to
the chaotic regime constitutes a phase transition, which occurs as a variety
of parameters are changed. The transition region, on the edge between
order and chaos, is the complex regime. ”[87, p. 174]
3Clearly, boolean networks are just one possible approach to simulate dynamical systems and thus,
exemplify terms like ’attractor’, ’basin of attraction’ and the like. However, given that they are among
the most simple ones, they are well-suited to satisfy our needs. Furthermore, the central results obtain
on this model can easily be transfered to more sophisticated ones as e.g. differential equations.
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It turns out that one of the most important parameters of boolean networks is the
number K of inputs per node4. K specifies on how many components of the system,
i.e. nodes of the network, the consecutive state of a single node depends. For example,
in a network with K = 3, the state of each node depends on three other nodes, possibly
including itself. Interestingly, the network properties which are of relevance to us -
flexible yet stable - are largely determined by K, independent of the exact type of local
transition rules. Thus, the local transition rules may be chosen at random (Random
Boolean Networks) without changing the global network behavior. Specifying K is
sufficient to determine if the network will be locate in the chaotic, in the ordered, or
in the complex regime. The class of Random Boolean Networks determined by N
(number of nodes) and K (number of inputs per node) is called NK-Networks.
Apparently, the maximum possible number of inputs for a single node is N, i.e. if
K = N, the state of each node of the network depends on the states of all the nodes of
network, including itself. Such a system is deep in the chaotic regime, characterized by
elevated number of attractors, which have typically small basins of attraction and rather
long cycles. Thus, these attractors are unstable. Reducing the level of interdependence
by lowering K introduces more stability. Around K = 2, the complex regime is reached,
before at lower values of K the network ’freezes in’ and assumes an ordered state (cf.
[88]):
”Thus systems with millions of elements can crystallize order if each ele-
ment is affected by only a few others. The emergence of order does not re-
quire that all details of structure and ’logic’ be controlled precisely. Hence
a rich vein of order lies available for selection’s further sifting.”[87, p.
174]
Thus, under certain conditions order may emerge from purely stochastic processes.
Systematically randomized behavior on the lower level of a system may be a solid basis
for lawful behavior on higher levels. Schro¨dinger points out that a similar relationship
can be found in thermodynamics, where stochastic models on a molecular level are the
basis for deterministic laws governing the relations between supra-molecular properties
as e.g. heat and density (cf. [71]). Summarizing the results obtain from simulation with
Random Boolean Network, two things have to be noticed:
a.) Not all possible states of a system are equally probable, which stands in stark
contrast to the claim upon which the ’improbability of order’ is based (cf. section
3.1.1). As a consequence, the system ends up squeezed into tiny portions of the
state space. Thus, the true probability of a state (as determined by the systems
dynamics) may deviate significantly from the ’naively expected’ probabilities.
b.) Rather loosely interconnected systems (K = 2) are poised at the edge between
’chaos and order’ and thus, exhibit the mixture of variability and stability needed
4In the given context, we will abstain from a rigorous formal presentation of Random Boolean Net-
works, as this would go beyond the scope of this discussion. Such a presentation would also include a
more precise definition of the defining parameters and the resulting system behavior, which can be found
e.g. in [82]
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for evolution through natural selection. The details of the systems architecture
can be determined in a randomized fashion and thus, can be seen as relatively
irrelevant.
3.2.3 Modular units
In the previous section, certain properties of the units themselves were examined. More
precisely, the optimum balance between stability and variability as a requirement for
evolution through natural selection has been discussed in the context of randomized
NK-networks. However, for evolution to work, not only the units of evolution, but the
fitness landscape itself needs to exhibit a certain property: it needs to be correlated (cf.
2.2.3):
”Things capable of evolving [...] all live and evolve on landscapes that
themselves have a special property: they allow evolution to ’work’: These
real fitness landscapes, the types that underly Darwin’s gradualism, are
’correlated’. Nearby points [in morphospace] tend to have similar heights
[fitness values].”[70, p.169]
The basic idea of this argument is simple: if minor changes of an organism’s traits,
i.e. a small movement in morphospace, cause major changes in the organism’s fitness, a
continuous, gradual improvement of the overall design (bodyplan) via the accumulation
of multiple minor improvements is not possible. Thus, as a requirement for gradualism,
a correlated fitness landscape is needed5.
Given that our goal is to develop a more precise notion of a functional, evolutionary
unit, this knowledge concerning the shape of the unit’s fitness landscape can be used
as a point of departure to examine the unit itself. Stated in other words, the question is
what types of units exhibit correlated fitness landscapes? What internal organization of
a unit is needed to achieve the required correlation between morphospace and overall
fitness? In order to tackle this question, it is worth noticing that the characterization
of a morphospace via certain features or traits can be seen as a first level description
of the unit. On this level, a characterization of the organization, the structure and
the mechanisms determining the units second level behavior is given. Fitness, on the
other hand, appears as a certain aspect of this second level description and thus, could
be termed a second level feature or trait. As such, fitness is a property of the whole
unit and not only of separate parts and the notion of a correlated fitness landscape
translates into a specific relation between first level structure and second level behavior.
Kauffman’s approach to analyze this relation is to decompose the notion of fitness. He
distinguishes between the overall fitness of an organism and a trait-specific fitness:
even though the overall fitness is a property of the organism as a whole, for selection to
act upon individual features of the organism, these features must be related somehow
to the overall fitness. Hence, it is conceptually sound to assign individual fitness values
to individual traits. Thus, the overall fitness can be seen as a non-linear combination
of the trait-specific fitness values:
5See [87, p. 45 et seq.] for a detailed discussion of the properties of uncorrelated fitness landscapes.
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”... the contribution to overall fitness of the organism of one state of
one trait may depend in very complex ways on the states of many other
traits.”[70, p.170]
Thus, the trait specific fitness is not independent of the other traits of an organism:
if some feature is advantageous or not depends on multiple other features. As an exam-
ple, the interdependence between brain, hands, vocalization and upright gait has been
discussed (cf. e.g. [89]): a highly developed brain is rather useless without the neces-
sary tools (hands and voice) to manipulate the world in a sophisticated way. Likewise,
hands capable of accurate movements are are not truly helpful without the upright gait,
which is not only freeing the anterior limbs from the tedious job of carrying the body,
but which places them in the field of vision too.
Thus, when trying to draw conclusions concerning the structure of evolutionary
units from the requirements for gradualism, we are apparently trapped in the following
conflict:
a.) For evolution through natural selection to act upon single features of a unit,
those features must contribute to the overall fitness of the unit in a relatively
autonomous way. Otherwise, small changes in one single feature would have a
strong impact on the overall fitness of the organism and thus, gradual evolution
via the accumulation of minor changes would not be possible. In this case, evo-
lution would only be possible as the simultaneous change of all features of an
organism.
b.) A brief look at nature tells us that the utility of individual traits indeed depends
upon multiple other traits of an organism: Wings are as useless to a dolphin as
gills to a horse. I.e. evolutionary units are functionally integrated.
For the sake of gradualism and thus, for evolvability, functionally independent traits
are required (a). In contrast to this, we have to concede that our very notion of func-
tionality implies the integration of parts to a functional (fit) whole (b).
Kauffman considers this situation as a task consisting of conflicting constraints, and
proposes the following model to simulate the correlation between i.) a units internal
structure, namely the level of interdependence present among its parts, and ii.) the
corresponding fitness landscape: The morphospace of our model organism is defined
by set of binary features, variables which may assume just two different states. The
individual fitness contribution of each feature is not only determined by the state of
the variable itself, but also by the state of K other randomly chosen variables. To each
possible configuration of this K + 1 binary variables (i.e. 2K+1), a fitness value between
0 and 1 is assigned at random. Thus, if one feature is changed, on average K individual
fitness values are affected. The overall fitness is simply defined as the sum over the
individual fitness values. Using this model, the relation between i.) the amount of
interdependence present measured by K, and ii.) the shape of the fitness landscape can
be examined. The results are illustrated in Figure 3.11.
For low values of K, highly correlated fitness landscapes are obtained, posing op-
timization problems which are easy to solve. With K increasing, the corresponding
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Figure 3.11: Correspondence between the level of functional interdependence present
in a system and the resulting fitness landscape. If the level of functional interdepen-
dence is very low, as shown on the left hand side (A), gradual improvements are possi-
ble and the maximum on the fitness landscape can easily be found. This can be seen as
an optimization problem without any conflicting requirements, i.e. each feature can be
adapted independent of the others so as to attain a maximal overall fitness. If the level
of interdependence increases (B), the fitness landscape becomes more rugged, and fi-
nally (C) violates the requirements for gradualism: small difference in morphospace
can cause catastrophic changes in fitness. For details, refer to section 3.2.3
fitness landscapes become more and more jagged, finally leading to completely ran-
domized surfaces for K = N: if the change of one single feature affects the fitness
values of all other features, the overall fitness - as the sum of all individual fitness val-
ues - is decorrelated from the underlying morphospace. Almost identical combinations
of features, e.g. two organism differing in just one single trait, may exhibit a completely
different overall fitness.
As we know that the traits of a unit are indeed functionally integrated, we have to
exclude those models with very low values of K. Even though gradualism would work
for such units, we know that the secret of success lies in the functional integration
of parts into a whole. An evolutionary unit is not a collection of more or less useful
traits which are independent from each other. On the other hand, we can see that highly
integrated units, represented by those models with elevated values of K, are not capable
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of gradual evolution.
Thus we may tentatively conclude that each evolutionary unit has to exhibit a cer-
tain level of modularity, which optimizes the trade-off between evolvability (indep-
dence of features) and functional integration.
3.3 Summary
Before examining the answers proposed by Kauffman in the form of formal models and
computer simulations, we have tried to formulate an explicit problem statement in a
first step (cf. section 3.1). Among the problems associated with living units, the origin
of life is a particularly well-suited example for the circularity inherent to question and
answer, to phenomenon and model. In this case, we are confronted with the task to
provide an explanation for an event that occurred billions of years ago and which can no
longer be observed. Hence, defining the problem in first place can arguably be seen as
more difficult than providing suitable models for an already well-defined phenomenon.
Indeed, we may even ask if there is a problem at all. After all, it is not ’nature itself’
asking questions and demanding answers, but our very own understanding of nature
which exhibits ’gaps’ that call for a theory to fill them. Thus, we have to diagnose in
the first place that the origin of life constitutes such a gap in our knowledge.
We are confronted with something that appears to be highly improbable in the light
of our current knowledge (cf. subsection 3.1.1), yet we are here, no matter how im-
probable it may appear to us. Hence, we are looking for a theory which explains the
emergence of living units as something sufficiently probable. Given that life is highly
improbable if seen as a closed thermodynamic system, we concluded that closed ther-
modynamic systems are no suitable model for life, and adopted the notion of open
dissipative systems instead. Kauffman also asserts that the origin of living units can
not be understood as a gradual, continuous process, but rather has to be modeled as a
holistic, emergent phenomenon. He argues that the organization of todays life forms
is a circular one, in which hardly any component is superfluous. More precisely, he
claims that an accumulative evolution of a system formed by mutually interdependent
components has to be seen as impossible. If all components of a system are equally im-
portant for the system’s functioning, the system can not be assembled in step-by-step,
one-by-one fashion. Ergo, we seek a model which explains the emergence of life as
whole, living units (cf. subsection 3.1.2). What we can also learn from recent species,
according to Kauffman, is the existence of a certain minimal complexity required be-
low which no living unit can exist (cf. subsection 3.1.3). Independent from the exact
definition of ’simple’ and ’free living’ that is employed, the claim that there is no such
thing as a simple, free living organism seems to be beyond all reasonable doubt.
Thus, as summarized in section 3.2, the main problem is to provide a model that
a.) makes the emergence of open, ordered, dissipative systems probable,
b.) in which this emergence is a single-step event (holistic) and
c.) which allows for natural selection to take place.
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The last claim addresses the requirements which need to be satisfied such that evolution
through natural selection becomes feasible. This includes primary a certain mechanism
of reproduction, a suitable balance between stability and variability, and, above all, a
certain fitness-landscape which allows for gradual improvement.
The theory of autocatalytic sets outlined in subsection 3.2.1 represents a model
addressing b.) in the first place. Mutual catalysis among a set of chemicals can lead to
positive feedback loops, which in turn stabilize the formation of the catalytic network
itself. This network is holistic insofar as mutual catalysis requires the simultaneous
presence of all interacting members of the network. Thus, the spontaneous formation
of such a network, which is according to Kauffman highly probable under certain con-
ditions (a.)), can be seen as the single-step emergence of living units. A more recent
extension of autocatalytic sets can be found in the Graded Autocatalytic Replication
Domain (GARD) model, which also addresses question c.), i.e. the requirements for
natural selection. The concept of a compositional genome is proposed as a model for
a primitive form of inheritance. As the name suggests, the ’information’ contained in
such a genome is encoded in the composition of various chemicals, which are the ele-
ments of a catalytic network. From a chemical point of view, such a network is nothing
but a cocktail of different ingredients. If a random split of this cocktail is performed, the
composition of the contained ingredients remains on average identical (stability), but
also allows for a certain variability. Another account for the subject matter of stability
versus variability are Random Boolean Networks (cf. subsection 3.2.2), exhibiting a
suitable number of attractors. Most importantly, Kauffman demonstrates that the de-
tails of the network architecture need not be specified in order to obtain reasonable net-
work behavior in terms of ’stability’ and ’variability’. Furthermore, we have seen that
natural selection (cf. question c.)) requires a certain type of fitness landscape. More
precisely, any type of optimization technique based on local information is doomed to
fail if the function to be optimized lacks a certain ’smoothness’. Figuratively speaking,
on a rugged landscape made up of pinnacles, canyons and abysms, simply walking
uphill will lead to a very poor, local optimum. On such a landscape, a random search
may be just as good as natural selection. Now, good landscapes on which natural se-
lection can work are correlated landscapes, i.e. a small change in phenospace leads to
a small change in fitness. Based on the model proposed by Kauffman (cf. subsection
3.2.3), such correlation landscapes require a modular structure of the unit to be opti-
mized. Stated in other words, for natural selection to work, a certain independence of
the features contributing to the unit’s fitness is required.
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Chapter 4
HUMBERTO MATURANA
In contrast to the previous chapters, Maturana introduces epistemological aspects
into the concept of an evolutionary unit. Metaphorically speaking, Maturana takes a
step back and before asking the question ”what is an evolutionary unit?”, he tries to
answer the question ”what does it mean to ask a question?”. By doing so, he assumes
a constructivistic point of view1, which in turn fundamentally alters his notion of an
evolutionary unit.
More precisely, Maturana rejects the notion of cognition as a representation of some
external reality and claims that each unit is brought forth by an observer through an
act of distinction. Given that each observer is seen as a living unit, cognition as the
operation of distinction becomes the fundamental capacity of life. Consequently, un-
derstanding life and understanding understanding become challenges which can not
be addressed separately (cf. section 4.1). Maturana’s approach to this challenges can
be found in the concept of autopoiesis, i.e. the concept of self-creation. Autopoiesis, as
the defining property of living units, can also be understood as the structure governing
the ’understanding of understanding’. In this spirit, Maturana’s theory of living units
(cf. section 4.2) as autopoietic systems constructs the emergence of the observer itself,
i.e. in a constructivistic sense, it describes the phenomenon of cognition.
4.1 Knowledge and cognition
The objective of this section is to outline relativism respectively constructivism as op-
posed to objectivism respectively representationism. Note that we are treating this
terms, namely relativism - constructivism and objectivism - representationism, as equi-
valent, assuming that each of them highlights a different aspect of the same position.
More precisely, we will briefly outline Maturana’s arguments against representation-
ism (cf. subsection 4.1.1), followed by a discussion of the main difficulties originating
from constructivism in subsection 4.1.2. As a conclusion of this epistemological in-
quiries, Maturana’s notion of science as a defeat of solipsism is presented in subsection
4.1.3.
4.1.1 Representationism
As the primary requirement of representationism, an objective reality, i.e. a subject in-
dependent reality has to be assumed. Apart from claiming the existence of an objective
reality, as a second requirement of representationism, it has to be assumed that we do
1We follow the notion of ’constructivism’ as coined by H. von Foerster: ”Die Umwelt, so wie wir sie
wahrnehmen, ist unsere Erfindung.” (The world, as we perceive it, is our own invention - K.M.) [90].
have some sort of cognitive access to this reality. Stated in other words, claiming that
an objective reality exists is not yet enough for representationism to work. We also
have to assume that we are able to know something about this objective reality, namely
that we can ”make cognitive statements” about this reality. Thus, the core concept of
representationism can be summarized in the following claim:
”We exist in an objective world that can be known and about which we can
make cognitive statements that reveal it as an independent reality whose
validity is, therefore, independent from us as observers.”[91, p.1]
Note that representationism is not self-satisfying or circular, i.e. the underlying
notion of reality as an objective, subject-independent one is a prerequisite for represen-
tationism, but none of its consequences. The claim that there is an external, subject-
independent reality is none of the cognitive statements that we can make based on
representationism, neither does it follow from representationism that we have some
sort of cognitive access to this reality. Thus, both the objectivity of reality as well
as our cognitive access to it have to be postulated, and can not be derived within the
epistemological framework provided by representationism.
Furthermore, representationism also incorporates the antique, Aristotelian concept
of truth as correspondence between statement (claim) and reality. Thus, cognition as
the process of gaining knowledge about the outside reality can be seen as the task of
constructing the ’right’ mapping between statements and reality. Naturally, the question
arises how correct and erroneous mappings can be distinguished and one of the criteria
proposed is that of ’successful predictions’. If we are able to predict what the reality
will be like in the future based on our representation of it, this capability to predict is a
proof for the correctness of our representation. However, Maturana claims that ...
”... a successful prediction does not prove that the operation through
which we make it reflects an objective reality, or constitutes an expression
of our cognitive access to this reality.”[91, p.1]
Indeed, the problem to distinguish between correct and incorrect representations
is not alleviated, but merely restated, if we are using the distinction between correct
and incorrect predictions to solve it. The basic problem underlying the antique truth
criteria of representationism is that of comparing a statement, i.e. the representation,
and reality, i.e. that which is represented. A representationist needs to explain what it
is exactly that shall be compared here, and how this comparison shall be carried out.
The correctness of a statement which is supposed to describe a current state of the
world (representation) does not become any more comprehensible when the statement
is supposed to describe a future state of the world (prediction). Stated in other words,
if we want to proof that ’X is the case’, we do not gain anything by examining if ’X
will be the case’, as the problem is basically left unchanged by referring to different
points in time. Indeed, a ’post-diction’ (’X was the case’) would be just as helpful in
this respect as a pre-diction.
Maturana also points out that this notion of cognition as a mapping hardly can be
’mapped’ onto our biological understanding of human perception. From a neurological
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point of view, the question naturally arises how this mapping-process is reflected on the
’biological basis’. For Maturana it is obvious that the notion of a mapping or a corre-
spondence between reality and knowledge is inconsistent with a biological perspective
on human cognition (cf. [92, p.21 et seq.]).
If our senses are seen as detectors of filters which inform us about the external
reality, we also have to concede that the information we obtain about this outside-world
is not objective, because ...
”... it is a general feature of all filters that their organization determines
what passes through them [...]. If our sense organs function as filters we
cannot use them to make any objective statement about the external world
...”[91, p.2]
Apart from the fact that, according to Maturana, the human senses can not be un-
derstood as sensors or filters, one central observation concerning representationism can
be extracted from the quote above: As a requirement for representationism, we need
some sort of direct, objective access to the external world. If we want to proof the cor-
rectness of a mapping by a comparison between statement and reality, we need some
direct, cognitive access to this reality in the first place. This means that the reality
we want to ’discover’ during the cognitive process needs to be a known reality, i.e. it
already needs to be part of what we know in order to serve as a criteria for faithful
representations. Thus, the harder we try to build upon objective reality as the basis of
cognition, the softer it gets.
Summarizing, the root of this comparison problem seems to lie in the very notion
of objective reality as something which is per defintionem not part of our cognitive
domain, but external to it. Thus, as we know only what we know, and as we are not able
to compare something that we suspect to be true (i.e. a statement concerning reality)
with the unknown reality itself, the projected grounding of knowledge in reality itself is
doomed to fail. Apparently, we are trying to compare something we do not know (i.e.
a non verified statement) with something else that we do not know either (i.e. reality
itself) in order to gain knowledge (i.e. a verified statement).
In order to circumvent the problems involved in outlining how a direct comparison
between statement and reality is possible, an indirect correspondence derived from the
functionality (’efficiency’) of our knowledge has been proposed. The basic idea behind
this notion is that, if we are able to efficiently handle something, i.e. if we know how
something ’functions’, than we can justifiably assume that we posses a correct repre-
sentation of its internal structure. From an evolutionary point of view, the correctness
of a representation is crucial to our success as a biological species, for it determines
our behavior. Metaphorically speaking, surviving reality appears to be difficult with
an erroneous notion of reality, just as ’solving a problem’ appears to be difficult if the
problem itself is unknown.
”We obtain knowledge through our sense organs by a process of mapping
the objective external reality onto our nervous system, accommodating our
behavior to the structure of the world revealed through this mapping.”[91,
p.1]
66
As we will see in the following section, Maturana indeed assumes a close rela-
tionship between cognition and evolutionary success, but rejects that efficiency implies
faithful representation. Just as a successful prediction does not represent some direct
feedback from reality itself, a statement does not become a true statement - in the rep-
resentationist’s meaning - just because it is useful for those who believe it to be true.
4.1.2 Constructivism
The core concept of Maturanas epistemological position can be seen in his claim that
every statement is subject-dependent. If something is known, it is always known by
someone, and any cognitive action is always carried out by someone. Hence, there is
no subject-independent epistemological process.
”Alles Gesagte ist von jemandem gesagt.” (Everything said is said by
somebody - K.M.)[92, p.31]
Given that knowledge and cognition are always subject-dependent, the possibility
of objective, subject-independent knowledge is negated. As a consequence, the claim
that ’there is an objective reality’ has to be seen as a subject-dependent claim, that
can neither be verified, nor be explained in a representationistic framework. As the
only notion of reality that we have is our subject-dependent knowledge about reality,
the claim that reality itself is objective can impossibly be verified. Departing from the
very definition of objective reality, it follows that this reality can never be known in
a subject-independent manner. Hence, any statement about the ’objective reality’ is,
by its very definition, unprovable. Similar to Kant’s ”Ding an sich”, objective real-
ity disappears into the depth of some unknowable metaphysical realm. Summarizing,
we have to notice that negating objective knowledge renders the notion of an objec-
tive reality obsolete or, as the early Wittgenstein would have termed it, ’meaningless’.
Figuratively speaking, objective reality becomes invisible and thus, can not be used to
explain what we can or can not see, simply because ...
”Wir sehen nicht, daß wir nicht sehen.” (We do not see that we do not see
- K.M.)[92, p.23]
However, apart from deconstructing objectivity, the concept of cognition or obser-
vation as a process which does not alter its object is rejected, as Maturana claims that
...
”Jedes Tun ist Erkennen und jedes Erkennen ist Tun.” (To act is to recog-
nize and to recognize is to act - K.M.)[92, p.30] ”... jeder Akt des Erken-
nens eine Welt hervorbringt.” (...each act of cognition brings forth a world
- K.M.)[92, p.30]
Cognition is indeed seen as a process which actively generates or constructs its
object, instead of passively recognizing or perceiving it. Thus, the notion of reality
undergoes a major change here, as it is re-defined as a construction, a product of the
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subject’s activity. The basic idea behind this claim of a ’constructed reality’ is the
following one: once the possibility of objective knowledge is rejected, the notion of
an objective reality becomes a ’metaphysical phantasm’, i.e. something that we can
not know anything about. Believing in an objective reality may be useful for a variety
of reasons, but this believe can impossibly be verified within representationism. Thus,
the only reality we have got left, is the one we know about, and everything we know
depends on us, i.e. is subject dependent. Hence, if the term ’reality’ shall be used in a
meaningful way, ’reality’ has to be considered as a subject-dependent construction.
In a certain sense, Maturana has inverted the traditional notion of cognition here:
whereas normally some external or objective reality serves as the basis for knowledge,
Maturana points out that ’all we know is what we know’, i.e. our knowledge is the
only basis we have got to comprehend what ’reality’ is. Thus, instead of considering
cognition as a process in which, departing from reality, knowledge about this reality
is accumulated, cognition is seen as a process in which, departing from knowledge,
reality itself is actively evolved by the subject.
”Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a process
of cognition.”[93, p.7]
Cognition, understood as activity which constructs reality, is thus not one single,
specific ability of homo sapiens but rather a very basic capacity of all living beings. As
such, it is not constrained to the nervous system, but rather can be identified with the
activity of being alive itself. Consequently, life itself is a cognitive process which in
turn implies that cognition itself is subject to evolution.
”Erkennen ist effektive Handlung, das heißt, operationale Effektivita¨t im
Existenzbereich des Lebewesen.” (Cognition is effective action, that is, op-
erational effectiveness in the domain of existence of living beings - K.M.)
[92, p.35]
”Erkennen als wirksame Handlung, das heißt, als eine Handlung, die es
einem Lebewesen in einem bestimmten Milieu erlaubt, seine Existenz darin
fortzusetzen, indem es dort eine Welt hervorbringt.” (Cognition as effective
action, that is, as an action that allows an animal in a certain environment
to continue its existence in it, by bringing forth a world in it - K.M.) [92,
p.36]
When defining cognition as an effective action, the traditional notion of truth as
correspondence is replaced by a functional concept of truth. In contrast to the repre-
sentationist claim, that a correct representation of the outside world is necessary for
survival, survival itself is seen as a requirement for cognition, but this does not entail
a correct representation of some external reality. Whereas in the case of representa-
tionism, the objective reality is seen as a given problem that needs to be understood in
order to be solved, in the case of constructivism constructing and solving the problem
is seen as one and the same action. Thus, the correctness of cognition is no longer a re-
quirement for survival, but survival has become the only requirement for ’correctness’,
i.e. for ’effective action’.
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Hence, due to the crucial role the subject plays in Maturana’s epistemology, and
due to the fact that this subject is understood as a biological one, the questions ”what
is cognition?” and ”what is a living unit?” are intimately interrelated.
”Cognition is a biological phenomenon and can only be understood as
such; any epistemological insight into the domain of knowledge requires
this understanding.”[93, p.6]
However, before proceeding to the concept of a cognitive, biological unit (cf. sec-
tion 4.2), the implications of a strictly subject-dependent notion of knowledge have to
be examined.
4.1.3 Solipsism and science
As emphasized in the previous section, Maturana has relativized the distinction be-
tween ’cognition’ as passive perception of reality and ’taking action’ as an active
change of reality. Consequently, when using this distinction, we now have to take
into account that the relationship between cognition and action is a circular one, as, in
a certain sense, we can not distinguish between perceiving and changing reality. This
circular, constructivistic nature of cognition apparently affects this very inquiry too,
because ...
”... die Zirkularita¨t zwischen Handlung und Erfahrung auch fu¨r das, was
wir hier und jetzt tun, gilt.” (...the circularity between action and cognition
also applies to what we are doing right now - K.M.)[92, p.31]
Stated in other words, we can no longer act as if we were standing ’outside’, as if we
could describe some external reality. We have to take into account that, along this very
lines, the object of this investigation is constructed. This relativity could lead to the
uncomfortable situation of complete arbitrariness: Without some fixed point as e.g. an
external, objective reality, our knowledge seems to disappear into mere believes, all of
which are equally ’wrong’ or ’right’. The world around us, as our own private construct,
seems to be completely at our mercy, with ourselves, i.e. with the subject at it’s center.
However, Maturana points out that such a solipsism only arises if constructivistic ideas
are intermingled with objectivistic remains.
”... solipsism arises as a problem only if we insist on demanding from a
subject dependent cognitive domain the properties of a subject independent
cognitive domain.”[91, p.4]
One such property would be e.g. the notion of an absolute truth grounded in a
faithful representation of the objective reality. For the sake of illustration, let us as-
sume that we have just abolished the difference between ’true’ and ’false’ statements,
namely by means of the following statement A: ”There are no such things as ’true’ or
’false’ statements”. From an objectivistic point of view, this statement has to be seen
as contradictory as it can not be neither true nor false, and thus, needs to be rejected.
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However, this objection is only possible if the statement itself is taken as an objectivis-
tic one: if it is ’taken seriously’, the distinction between true and false can no longer
be used when judging the statement and thus, claiming that this statement is contra-
dictory has to be considered as a misunderstanding of the statement itself. Indeed, if
proposition A is read as a pre-scription rather than as a de-scription, the difference be-
comes more obvious: objectivism aims at providing descriptions, but this very claim is
abandoned by constructivism.
Likewise, if the distinction between an objective and a subjective reality is dissolved
as outlined above, solipsism disappears. Thus, the ontological status of constructivistic
statements can no tbe assessed using an objectivistic ontology. Given that the notion of
an external, objective reality is revealed as an unprovable claim, the distinction between
’objective’ and ’subjective’ reality becomes meaningless:
”The question, What is the object of knowledge? becomes meaningless.
There is no object of knowledge. To know is to be able to operate ade-
quately in an individual or cooperative situation.”[93, p.29]
Nonetheless, even though solipsism can be avoided using Wittgensteinian argu-
ments, the question remains how a positive notion of truth and, consequently, of science
is possible. Stated in other words, even though relativism and complete arbitrariness
can be avoided pointing out that the underlying terms and concepts can no longer be
applied, the question remains if and how science is still possible. First of all it has to
be noticed that science, just like any other type of knowledge, is subject dependent too:
”... since I want to give a scientific description of the observer as a sys-
tem capable of descriptions (language), I must take the subject dependent
nature of science as my starting point.”[94, p.2]
Apart from this notion of science as a subject dependent endeavor, the above for-
mulation of Maturanas goal is worth noticing as well: we seek a subject-dependent
description of the ”observer as a system capable of descriptions”, thus, we are appar-
ently trying to provide a self-describing description. Stated in other words, understand-
ing living units and understanding ’understanding itself’ can be seen as corresponding
tasks from this point of view. Metaphorically speaking, looking at one of these two
phenomena, living units or cognition, will facilitate the understanding of the other one.
Returning to the problem of science, Maturana exploits the concept of question
and answer to outline his understanding of science as a non-arbitrary, but nonetheless
subject-dependent process. Science is now defined via a special type of explanations,
namely scientific explanations, which, in first place, provide answers to questions, just
like any other type of explanation.
”... an explanation is always an answer to a question about the origin of a
given phenomenon, and is accepted or rejected by a listener who accepts
or rejects it according to whether or not it satisfies a particular implicit or
explicit criterion of acceptability that he or she specifies. Therefore, there
are as many different kinds of explanations as there are different criteria
of acceptability ...”[95, p.4]
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In contrast to the objectivistic notion of science, this formulation emphasizes the
pragmatic and dynamic aspects of science as a social practice, which is taking place
within a specific cultural, sociological context. Science is no longer characterized by
some privileged access to objective reality, but is seen merely as a special form of com-
munication, following the spirit of Wittengsteins’ Sprachspiele, which can be analyzed
and described using the ordinary concepts of ’question’ and ’answer’.
Thus, we now have defined science via its use of scientific explanations, which
are in turn defined via a specific criteria of acceptability. Maturana formulates four
conditions which, taken together, represent the criterion of acceptability for scientific
explanations. For an explanation to be considered as scientific, it needs to satisfy the
following four requirements2:
a. ”The specification of the phenomenon to be explained through the stipulation of
the operations that a standard observer must perform [...] in order to also be a
witness of it ...”[95, p.5]
b. ”The proposition [...] of [...] a generative mechanism, which when allowed to
operate gives rise as a consequence of its operation to the phenomenon to be
explained, to be witnessed by the observer .... This generative mechanism [...] is
usually called the explanatory hypothesis ...” [ibid.]
c. ”The deduction [...] of other phenomena that the standard observer should be
able to witness ...” [ibid.]
d. ”The actual witnessing [...] of the phenomena deduced in (c) ...” [ibid.]
First of all it is worth noticing that the explanation sought in the second step, i.e.
the explanatory hypothesis represents a mechanistic one: it describes the mechanism
underlying and generating a certain phenomenon. Consequently, the compatibility be-
tween hypothesis and phenomenon can still be seen as the criteria for scientific correct-
ness. However, none of these two components is a fixed point of reference any longer,
nor is there any substantial difference between the two aspects ’phenomenon’ and ’ex-
planation’. The specification of the phenomenon as well as the description of the gen-
erative mechanism are operations carried out by the observer. They are both subject-
dependent manipulations of the observers cognitive domain, i.e. self-manipulations,
which - according to Maturana - happen to comply with our socio-cultural determined
notions of scientific practice.
Hence, scientific practice reflects the intrinsic circularity of cognition, but imple-
ments this circularity in a specific, socio-cultural determined manner which can be
characterized by the four criteria sketched above.
Now, as a result of this preliminary epistemological considerations, not only our
notion of science, but also the very objective of this inquiry has been transformed.
According to Maturana, living units have to be understood as cognitive systems at any
time, which implies that, during the course of our investigation, we have to take into
account that we as the observers providing a description are cognitive, living systems
2An alternative formulation of these requirements can be found in [92, p. 34].
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as well. Hence, we now seek a scientific explanation for the phenomenon of cognition,
which, as we will see in the next section, corresponds to explaining the emergence of
the observer.
4.2 Living units
As we have seen in the previous section, the explanation we seek is a circular one. In
stark contrast to this we have to recognize that the language we have to use to provide
this very explanation exhibits a linear structure. No matter if we consider the spoken or
the written language, we must proceed step by step, one by one. Furthermore, we are
not used to circular arguments, but rather to linear ones, just as we are accustomed to
explicit definitions. However, without a fixed point of reference, we have to accept that
there actually is no difference between explicit and implicit definitions and that indeed
the only possible definition is based on usage. More precisely, the meaning of a term
is determined by the way it is used in a specific context:
”In what follows I shall not offer any formal definitions for the various
terms used, such as cognition, life, or interaction, but I shall let their mean-
ing appear through their usage. This I shall do because I am confident that
the internal consistency of the theory will show that these terms indeed ad-
equately refer to the phenomena I am trying to account for, and because I
speak as an observer, and the validity of what I say at any moment has its
foundation in the validity of the whole theory, which, I assert, explains why
I can say it. Accordingly, I expect the complete work to give foundation to
each of its parts, which thus appear justified only in the perspective of the
whole.”[93, p.6]
The structuralistic flavor of this notion of meaning as usage is apparent and gets
further reinforced by the corresponding notion of validity as internal consistency. In
a strict sense, the structure of the argument is not merely a circular one, but consists
in a part-whole relationship, which resembles the popular notion of a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Consequently, as we will see in the following subsection 4.2.1, the distinction be-
tween two units respectively between part and whole is located at the very heart of
Maturanas explanation. However, understanding units can hardly be achieved by sim-
ply claiming that every unit is the result of an operation of distinction. We still seek a
mechanistic explanation of the internal dynamics of a unit and the way it interacts with
its environment (cf. subsection 4.2.2). Once the central concepts of ”structural cou-
pling” and ”structure determination” are introduced, we can finally proceed to Matu-
ranas concept of autopoiesis as the organizational principle governing living units (cf.
subsection 4.2.3).
4.2.1 Observer and unit
When approaching Maturanas notion of living systems, it is worth recalling in first
place his notion of cognition as a subject dependent activity, i.e. as the activity of a
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living unit. Thus, in order to understand living units, we need to understand cognition
as the fundamental biological capacity distinguishing the living from the non-living.
On the other hand, in order to understand cognition, we need to understand living units.
Thus, neither any question concerning life itself nor any epistemological problem can
be tackled in isolation:
”Anything said is said by an observer. In his discourse the observer speaks
to another observer, who could be himself; [...] The observer is a human
being, that is, a living system, and whatever applies to living systems ap-
plies also to him.”[93, p.7]
Note that this circular relation between living systems and cognition implies that
any attempt to understand cognition necessarily includes the attempt to gain self-aware-
ness. Metaphorically speaking, we are trying to formulate a theory which is capable to
’understand itself’, i.e. which does not only exhibit internal consistency, but in which
an observer is constructed. The fundamental epistemological operation carried out by
this observer is the operation of distinction and hence, the theory we seek needs to begin
with the distinction which is necessary to give rise to an observer. The distinction which
brings forth the observer is nothing but the distinction between the observer ’himself’
and the rest. It is the definition of the observer by its defining property, and this very
property is the operation of distinction. Hence, note that in the following quote the
observer himself is constructed by a distinction, i.e. the unit which is brought forth in
the following lines is the observer:
”The basic operation that an observer performs in the praxis of living is
the operation of distinction. In the operation of distinction an observer
brings forth a unity (an entity, a whole) as well as the medium in which it
is distinguished, ...”[95, p.9]
Clearly, this notion of a unit is anti-essentialistic and anti-realistic. There are no un-
changeable ideas manifesting themselves in the things we perceive, neither do we cap-
ture these ideas in a cognitive act. There is no independent, a priori reality which we do
access in cognitive acts and comprehension does not mean to get hold of the ’essence’
of something. Consequently, a ’correct’ definition of some phenomenon can not be
identified by means of some correspondence between definition and phenomenon, as
the phenomenon as a such does, strictly speaking, not exist. This is rather easy to un-
derstand when applied to social or cultural phenomena, such as ’religion’ for example.
Apparently, all we can do when defining the phenomenon of religion is to reformu-
late our implicit assumption on religion in a more precise way. We can gain a higher
level of self-awareness with respect to our own believes by stating explicitly what we
previously knew only implicitly. But claiming that we can distinguish between ’right’
and ’wrong’ definitions of religion in a correspondence-theoretic meaning apparently
makes no sense.
”For the observer an entity is an entity when he can describe it. [...] the
observer can describe an entity only if there is at least one other entity from
73
which he can distinguish it and with which he can observe it to interact or
relate. This second entity that serves as a reference for the description can
be any entity, but the ultimate reference for any description is the observer
himself. [...] The observer can define himself as an entity ...”[93, p.7]
When referring to something in our daily life, we usually do not think about ’mak-
ing a distinction’ but rather about ’making a description’. According to Maturana,
these terms are interchangeable, as at the very hear of each description lies the distinc-
tion between the described entity and the rest. Without this distinction, we would not
be able to identify the entity as such. Thus, the non-entity or, as termed in the quote
above, the ”second entity” serves as a point of reference which is necessary to identify
the ’first entity’. Apparently, first and second entity are interchangeable and thus, we
can not tell which one is the entity to be defined and which is the point of reference.
Consequently, describing an entity necessarily brings forth a point of reference as well.
Ultimately, this point may be either the observer itself or the rest, i.e. the second entity
from which the observer distinguishes itself. In this context, the ’I’ (ego) also has to be
considered as a construction brought forth by an act of distinction.
”Living systems are units of interactions; they exist in an ambience. From
a purely biological point of view they cannot be understood independently
of that part of the ambience with which they interact: the niche; nor can
the niche be defined independently of the living system that specifies it.”[93,
p.7]
In accordance with the concept of co-evolution of niche and species introduced
in subsection 2.2.1, Maturana once more affirms the interdependence between these
two entities. In a strict sense, the moment an observer distinguishes between niche
and species, both of them are brought into existence. As pointed out previously, the
distinction as the observer’s creative action generates both the unit and the rest, i.e. first
and second entity. Clearly, this also applies to the concept of species and niche.
4.2.2 Structure and organization
There are innumerable possibilities to carry out a distinction, just as there are innumer-
able possibilities to describe something. In order to distinguish, and hence describe,
life itself, Maturana introduces a distinction between organization and structure. To
begin with, organization ...
”...refers to the relations between components that define and specify a sys-
tem as a composite unity of a particular class, and determine its properties
as such a unity. Hence, the organization of a composite unity specifies the
class of entities to which it belongs.”[94, p.3]
While the organization of a unit determines what that unit is, i.e. to what class of
objects or systems it belongs, a unit’s structure is merely the realization of a specific
organization. More precisely, structure ...
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”...refers to the actual components and to the actual relations that these
must satisfy in their participation in the constitution of a given composite
unity.”[94, p.3]
Within the context of Maturana’s theory of life, both terms play complementary
roles: while the organization of a systems determines the class of the system, e.g. ’liv-
ing’ or ’non-living’, the structure of a system represents the purely individual, concrete
realization of its organization. Thus, class-identity is provided by the organization,
while individual identity is found in the system’s structure. Hence, the twin terms of
structure and organization can be seen as tools used to account for the general problem
of differences in uniformity respectively, uniformity despite differences: ’All humans
are humans, even though there are no two identical humans’. In the given context, the
terms are used to describe the class of all living beings.
Apart from being cognitive subjects, all living beings exhibit, according to Matu-
rana, the same organization, but may differ in their individual structure. In other words,
a certain type of organization is the criteria used to distinguish between the living and
the non-living, while the differences among organisms are accounted for by structural
differences. Note that both structure as well as organization have to be understood in a
mechanistic way: describing organization and structure of a systems implies describing
the mechanism governing that very unit. As we are here discussing the organization
of living systems, we are confronted with a mechanistic account of live, and not a e.g.
vitalistic one.
As an immediate consequence of such a mechanistic understanding, the concept of
structure-determined systems, which entails a certain notion of autonomy, emerges 3:
”... an external agent that interacts with a composite unity only triggers in
it a structural change that it does not determine. Since this is a constitu-
tive condition for composite unities, nothing external to them can specify
what happens in them; there are no instructive interactions for compos-
ite unities. [...] the structure of a composite unity also determines with
which structural configurations of the medium it may interact. [...] It fol-
lows from all this that composite unities are structure determined systems
in the sense that everything that happens in them is determined by their
structure.”[95, p.11]
”For an observer, the organization and structure of a structure determined
system determine both its domain of states and its domain of perturbations
as collections of realizable possibilities.”[94, p.5]
The structure of a system determines the possible states the system can enter, as
well as the perturbations from the outside which are possible. Thus, the environment
may ”trigger” changes in the systems behavior through perturbations, but it can not
3A more recent account of living systems as autonomous systems can be found in [96]. In accordance
with Maturana, a mechanistic explanation centered around a specific notion of organization is used to
define life in a systems biological context.
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”determine” or ”instruct” the system’s trajectories. Metaphorically speaking, the en-
vironment can only choose which path a system will follow, but it does not determine
the domain of possible paths. However, Maturana concedes that some perturbations
may disintegrate the system, which implies that the system ceases to exist as a unit.
However, in this case the environment does not determine the system, for at this point
the system is no longer existent.
As a further consequence, the system’s possibilities to perceive changes in the envi-
ronment are determined by the system’s structure as well: a modification in the environ-
ment which does not trigger any response within the system is - from the point of view
of the system - no change at all. Hence, Maturana’s notion of structure-determined sys-
tems also entails the notion of a system-referent environment, in contrast to a universal
physical environment. Note that this exact distinction is also made by Developmental
Systems Theory (cf. subsection 2.2.2).
Indeed, the concept of a system-referent environment can be seen as equivalent
to the claim outlined above that every observation is subject dependent. Recall that
’observation’ is not merely passive perception, but rather an active interaction with the
environment. Hence, structure-determination does not only imply a form of passive
autonomy in the flavor of ’we can only see what we can see’, i.e. we can only perceive
the world in the way our structure permits us to perceive it, but it does also imply an
active form of autonomy: the spectrum of possible actions is determined by the system
itself.
Now, we have emphasized at various occasions that the role of system and en-
vironment, of unit and niche respectively ambience (cf. subsection 4.2.1), are inter-
changeable. Thus, if confronted with multiple (i.e. at least two) autonomous, structure-
determined systems, the question arises how the interaction among these systems can
be understood. In such a case, apparently ...
”... changes of state of one system become perturbations for the other, and
vice versa, in a manner that establishes an interlocked, mutually selecting,
mutually triggering domain of state trajectories.”[94, p.5]
Thus, both systems maintain their autonomy, even though their state trajectories are
structurally coupled. They do not determine each other, but each system selects which
of the possible states of the other system will be chosen. Note that not only the set
of possible states to chose from is determined by the system itself, but also the set of
triggering changes performed by the selecting system: if a change in system A triggers
or selects a change in system B depends upon the structure of system B, because it
is up to system B to decide if there was a change in system A at all. Stated in other
words, the state and the structure of the system itself determines structure and possible
states (perturbations) of it’s environment. A change in the environment which can not
be perceived by the system is no change at all. Thus, mutual structural coupling leads
to a situation of mutual invisibility, which ultimately implies that the precise sequences
of states of both involved systems can only be reconstructed as a subject-dependent
sequence. Each system, including the observer of two structurally coupled systems,
perceives only what it’s structure permits to perceive and hence, identifying the ’true’
sequence of mutually triggering states is impossible.
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This concept of structural coupling also leads to a novel understanding of adapta-
tion:
”I call structural coupling or adaptation the relation of dynamic struc-
tural correspondence with the medium in which a unity conserves its class
identity (organization in the case of a composite unity, and operation of
its properties in the case of a simple one), and which is entailed in its
distinction as it is brought forth by the observer in his or her praxis of
living. Therefore, conservation of class identity and conservation of adap-
tation are constitutive conditions of existence for any unity (entity, system,
whole, etc.) in the domain of existence in which it is brought forth by the
observer in his or her praxis of living.”[95, p.13]
First of all notice that, in accordance with the Darwinian understanding of the term,
adaptation does not mean that some organism or systems is ’optimized’ or ’well-suited’
for some purpose or environment. In fact, adaptation has to be understood as a con-
structed property, which is derived from an organisms capacity to survive. As an or-
ganism’s capacity, we can not see ’adaptation’, but rather have to deduce it from a
comparison of multiple organism-environment pairs. But even though there seems to
be some sort of ’fit’ between organism and environment, the only criteria we actually
have to define ’adaptation’ is the existence of a concrete organism-environment pair.
Stated in other word, the only thing common to all organism-environment pairs, which
may be used to define adaptation, is their presence. Thus, as long as an organism or
species survives, it has to be considered as adapted. Given that we are not able to pre-
dict or define in some way what determines the survival of a system in general, we are
also not able to provide a more precise meaning for ’adaptation’. Hence, adaptation
has to be seen as a binary property common to all living systems which somehow man-
aged to exist as such, i.e. which managed to conserve their class identity. A system
respectively a unit which fails to adapt will loose its class identity and thus, will cease
to exist as such, i.e. it will disintegrate.
4.2.3 Autopoiesis of living systems
In contrast to the rather well-known concept of self-organization, Maturana and Varela
introduced the concept of self-creation, i.e. of autopoiesis as the defining criteria of
living systems. Given that the class identity of any system is defined by the system’s
organization, autopoietic systems are defined by their autopoietic organization. This
sort of organization is characterized by Maturana in the following way:
”There is a class of dynamic systems that are realized, as unities, as net-
works of productions (and disintegrations) of components that: (a) re-
cursively participate through their interactions in the realization of the
network of productions (and disintegrations) of components that produce
them; and (b) by realizing its boundaries, constitute this network of pro-
ductions (and disintegrations) of components as a unity in the space they
specify and in which they exist. Francisco Varela and I called such systems
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autopoietic systems, and autopoietic organization their organization (Mat-
urana Varela, 1973). An autopoietic system that exists in physical space
is a living system ...”[94, p.5 et seq.]
Thus, the two key characteristics of autopoietic organization are a.) a recursive
network of productions of the system’s components and b.) the system’s boundaries.
A certain resemblance with rather familiar biological concepts, such as metabolic net-
works and cellular membranes can hardly be neglected and is anything but a coinci-
dence. Indeed, the concept of autopoieses does not reject any findings of todays bio-
logical research, but rather provides a novel framework to re-interpret well-established
results. In what follows, we will have a brief look at some of this re-interpretations.
First of all, by pointing out that both a network of productions (metabolism) as well
as a clearly defined system-boundary (protective cellular membrane) is needed for live
to work, the holistic view of Kauffmann (cf. subsection 3.2.1 on emerging units) is
affirmed. Thus, the emergence of a living unit can not be understood as a sequential
process, in which e.g. in a first step some system-boundary appeared, which was, in
a second step, filled with some network of productions. Both components are equally
essential to live and thus, do not allow for a separate origin (cf. [92, p. 47 et seq.]).
Hence, based on this view, a continuous, gradual transition from the non-living to living
systems appears improbable.
Furthermore, the circularity, which provides the basis for the autonomy (cf. sub-
section 4.2.2) of living systems is omni-present in modern biology: there is hardly any
biological process without feedback loops, which are frequently essential for a system’s
stability. Note that a certain type of circularity is also central to Kauffmann’s findings
on stable networks (cf. subsection 3.2.2) and hence, a certain type of self-reference
(self-regulation) could be seen as necessary to autonomy, stability and homeostasis:
”This circular organization constitutes a homeostatic system whose func-
tion is to produce and maintain this very same circular organization ...”[93,
p.8]
When considering the above mentioned aspects of autopoietic organization, namely
the notion of a circular, self-referring network of productions enclosed by some mem-
brane, the correspondence to cellular organization is obvious. Indeed, Maturana ex-
plicitly states that cells are first order autopoietic systems (cf. [92]), in contrast to
second and third order autopoietic systems. The term ”metacellular” is introduced to
describe second order autopoietic systems as for example individual organisms. By
using the term metacellular Maturana emphasizes that multiple cells, as hidden in the
common term ’multicellular’, are not yet enough to constitute a second order unit. Fi-
nally, third order units are systems composed of second order units, as e.g. ant colonies.
Thus, the individual cell is a first order unit, a bee made up of cells is a second order
unit, and the beehive is a third order unit. Now, Maturana derives the primacy of the
individual cell from the following observation: during its life cycle, every organism un-
dergoes a single cellular stage (cf. [92]). Hence, the fundamental unit in life is not the
organism or the population, but the cell. Note that it has been claimed that the major
achievement of evolution was the formation of the cell, compared to which everything
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else, including the formation of higher order organisms, has to be considered as almost
trivial.
However, apart from this accordance concerning the cell as the central unit of life,
Maturana does not assume an evolutionary position. More precisely, neither evolution
nor reproduction are seen as essential characteristics of life itself:
” Evolutionary change in living systems is the result of that aspect of their
circular organization which secures the maintenance of their basic cir-
cularity, allowing in each reproductive step for changes in the way this
circularity is maintained. Reproduction and evolution are not essential for
the living organization ...”[93, p.9]
Thus, when trying to understand life, both reproduction and evolution have to be
seen as mere consequences, but not as the underlying principles. Indeed, reproduction
can be understood as a side effect of autopoiesis, which in turn allows for evolution as
a purely mechanistic process.
Furthermore, Maturanas notion of inheritance is based on his distinction between
organization and structure. The basic organization of life remains unchanged through-
out the generations, but as this organization can be realized by a variety of structures,
change and variability are possible. Indeed, the circular architecture of autopoietic
organization is not changed during evolution:
”...what changes is the way in which the basic circularity is maintained,
and not this basic circularity in itself.”[93, p.8]
Given that autopoiesis is the defining characteristic of life, each living unit must
maintain this very type of circular organization in order to maintain its class identity, i.e.
in simple terms, each living units needs to survive as such. As long as this requirement
is satisfied, all the other aspects may change. Hence, in a certain sense, Maturana
provides a minimalistic, almost formal notion of inheritance as the continuing capacity
to survive.
4.3 Summary
Departing from a thorough discussion of representationism, a constructivstic notion
of cognition and science has been developed. Based on this novel understanding, the
notion of autopoiesis was introduced in order to describe living systems. This notion,
in turn, allowed for the re-interpretation of a series of central biological terms, such as
adaptation, evolution and inheritance.
According to Maturana, representationism is characterized by the assumption that
there is some subject-independent, external reality which can be accessed by the cog-
nitive subject. Based on this access, some internal representation of this reality can be
obtained which is regarded as (true) knowledge, if it faithfully reflects (i.e. ’correctly
represents’) that reality (cf. section 4.1).
First of all it has to be noticed that this notion of cognition fails to prove its own
validity, i.e. in a representationist’s framework, the truth of the above statement can not
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be shown. In this sense, representationism has to be seen as inconsistent. More pre-
cisely, for representationism to work, some sort of direct, subject-independent access
to reality itself would be required. However, given that in the context of representa-
tionism the possibility of such an access is a precondition for any insight, the existence
of this access itself can never proven. In other words, a direct access to reality is a
requirement for representationism, but no conclusion of it. The root of this problem
lies in the comparison that needs to be carried out in order to distinguish correct and
incorrect representations: how to assess if some ’access to reality’ is a direct one? We
would have to compare the access in question with ..., well, with the direct one. Appar-
ently, the comparison required by representationism is impossible if we do not know
yet which access is the direct one, respectively which reality is the objective one. How-
ever, without a direct access, correct (true) and incorrect (false) representations can no
longer be distinguished. Furthermore, the notion of an objective, external reality be-
comes metaphysical, as it refers to something which can not be known (cf. subsection
4.1.1).
The first conclusion that has to be accepted if the above argument is taken seriously
is the ’primacy of knowledge over reality’. We can no longer act as if we were deriving
knowledge from reality, but rather have to admit that we are deriving reality from our
own, subject dependent knowledge. Whatever reality we thing of, it will always be a
known reality, for ’we do not see what we do not see’. Hence, any knowledge as well
as any reality is always subject dependent. Furthermore, the notion of cognition as a
somewhat passive perception of reality has to be abandoned in favor of an understand-
ing of cognition as an active, self-referring act of construction. ’Reality’ becomes a
product of the cognitive subject. Given that this subject is seen as a living unit, episte-
mological and biological questions become intimately related (cf. subsection 4.1.2).
The circular, self-referring aspect of cognition is reflected in Maturana’s notion
of science as the interplay between a specific type of ’question’ and ’answer’. The
reproach of solipsism is considered as meaningless, as it involves applying subject-
independent concepts to a subject dependent cognitive domain. Consider for example
the statement A.) ”There is no objective truth”. Claiming that this statement itself can
not be proven to be ’objectively true’ is rather a misunderstanding of the statement (as
a descriptive one), than a valid argument against it (cf. subsection 4.1.3).
In a certain sense, the point of departure for constructivism can be seen in the de-
construction of the representationist’s epistemological framework and the entailed dis-
tinctions. As we have seen above, the notion of an objective reality has been rejected
as a metaphysical one. This in turn implies that the strict dichotomy between ’subject’
and ’object’ is dissolved, as well as the distinction between ’passive perception’ and
’active creation’ or between ’knowledge’ and ’reality’. However, this de-construction
of differences leads to some sort of ”all is one” philosophy, which fails to provide a
scientific explanation of the phenomenon of cognition. Hence, in a second step Mat-
urana proposes a solution to the problem of cognition, which entails his notion of a
living unit as a cognitive subject (cf. section 4.2).
During the following (re-)construction process, the first distinction introduced is
the definition of an observer, as a unit which makes distinctions and thus, creates units.
Hence, the very definition of the observer can be seen as a constructive act which brings
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forth the observer itself (cf. section 4.2). This very distinction represents the core ele-
ment of Maturana’s theory of cognition. Apart from this self-description, a description
of the observer as a cognitive, biological unit as if it were external to the observer
providing this description can be provided. I.e. two levels have to be distinguished:
a.) strictly speaking, the circularity of knowledge (cognition) affects this very lines
as well and hence, each object of cognition, including cognition itself, has to be seen
as a construction of the observer (meta-level). Thus, self-description and self-creation
(auto-poiesis) are equivalent b.) However, making a distinction entails to act as if the
object of cognition were external to the observer (object level). Thus, the following
description of cognitive, living units is located on the object level.
On the object level, Maturana provides a series of novel interpretations of living
units. First of all, autonomy and adaptation of living units is explained via the concepts
of structure determined systems and structural coupling (cf. section 4.2.1). Given that
the structure of a unit determines the space of possible states this unit can assume, the
role of the environment is reduced to merely selecting possible states. This structure
determination includes cognition as well, i.e. what is and can be known is determined
by the observer (cognitive subject) itself, and not by some external reality. However,
given that the role of unit and environment are interchangeable, adaptation is seen as
the co-evolution of two independent systems, which are structurally coupled (cf. sec-
tion 4.2.2). Furthermore, a living system is characterized as a network of productions
which is enclosed by a clearly defined boundary. In this understanding of an autopoi-
etic system, the biological cell is identified as the prototype of a living system (first
order system), which can be distinguished from organisms (second order systems) or
colonies, swarms and the like (third order system). As a consequence, neither evolu-
tion nor reproduction (and inheritance) are seen as defining properties of life, but rather
as secondary phenomenons generated by the autopoietic structure of living units (cf.
section 4.2.3).
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
In accordance with his notion of the autopoietic organization of cognition, Matu-
rana also outlined a circular notion of science. In simplified terms, science is solving its
very own problems and providing answers to self-formulated questions. In this spirit,
we have to diagnose that the sources we employed in this work represent answers to
related, yet different questions. While Developmental Systems Theory (cf. chapter 2)
concentrates on the relation between development, evolution and inheritance, Kauff-
man (cf. chapter 3) heavily relies on computer models to clarify the mechanism under-
lying cellular organization and its origin. Maturana (cf. chapter 4) on the other hand,
introduces epistemological aspects into the discussion and attempts to understand life
as a cognitive process.
The question that we are pursuing in this work, i.e. ”what are functional, evolu-
tionary units in biology?”, both in general as well as in molecular-biological networks
in particular, is merely partially aligned with the research foci of the above directions
respective authors. However, given the central relevance of this question, it has been
addressed in some way, direct or indirect, by all of them. Even though different aspect
of our question are discussed and highlighted, two fundamentally different notions of a
biological unit can be identified: On the one hand, a unit can be understood as an object
of evolution and therefore, has to be described in the context of natural selection (cf.
section 5.1). On the other hand, given that the mechanism of natural selection is not
restricted to living units, it appears reasonable to seek alternative ways to capture the
specific ’nature’ of living units (cf. section 5.2). Finally, in section 5.3, an attempt is
made to apply the obtained results to functional units in molecular-biological networks.
5.1 Evolutionary units
The results discussed in this section can be understood as a reply to the following
question:
What is an evolutionary unit in biology?
For what concerns this notion of units, two types of results have to be distinguished:
First of all, it became clear that the mechanism of inheritance as well as the specific
level of selection, may it be e.g. gene-, group- or behavioral-selection, is completely
independent from the mechanism of natural selection. On the other other hand, both
the mechanism of inheritance and the level of selection directly entail a specific notion
of evolutionary unit (cf. subsection 5.1.1), i.e. defining a mechanism of inheritance
corresponds to defining an evolutionary unit and vice versa.
Second, the mechanism of selection does indeed impose a series of requirements
upon evolutionary units. The most apparent ones are probably best summarized by E.
Jablonka (cf. subsection 2.2.2):
”According to Darwin’s theory, in a world in which there are interact-
ing entities with the properties of multiplication, heredity, and heritable
variation that affects the chances of multiplication, natural selection will
necessarily occur, ...” [56, p. 9]
Given a population of units which exhibit differing rates of reproduction, and which
reproduce in a manner that transfers the reproduction-rate, natural selection will take
place. However, apart from this obvious requirements, several other, maybe less appar-
ent implications of the mechanism of natural selection can be identified (cf. subsection
5.1.2).
5.1.1 Universality of natural selection
As sketched above, natural selection has to be seen as a mechanism which will neces-
sarily occur given that certain very general requirements are fulfilled, namely the pres-
ence of a population of units with heritable, variable reproductive capacity. However,
several other aspects, including the mechanism of inheritance as well as the specific
level of selection are left untouched by natural selection. Moreover, a circular rela-
tion between these questions (inheritance, level of selection) and a certain notion of
evolutionary unit can be identified.
Inheritance
Deciphering the molecular structure of the DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953 was
arguably a major step towards answering why offspring resemble their parents. How-
ever, hidden behind this answer is a specific notion of evolutionary unit: both ’parent’
as well as ’offspring’ are understood as organisms in the traditional sense. Confronted
with the progress in genetics, this very understanding of evolutionary unit changed.
Given that only genes are assumed to be be reliably passed on from generation to gen-
eration, any non-genetic variation can impossibly become subject to evolution through
natural selection. Hence, a gene-centric view of selection resulted from a gene-centric
notion of inheritance.
However, given that the mechanism of natural selection is completely indifferent
with respect to the mechanism of inheritance, the strict dichotomy between genotype
and phenotype, between phylogenesis (evolution) and ontogenesis (development) has
to be seen as the result of an unjustified pre-conception of ’evolutionary unit’ (cf. sec-
tion 2.1).
Level of selection
The problem of the ’level of selection’ can be stated as follows (cf. subsection 2.2.3):
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”... the key question concerns the level of the biological hierarchy at which
natural selection occurs. Does selection act on organisms, genes, groups,
colonies, demes, species, or some combination of these?” [62, p. 349]
Given that natural selection can indeed act upon multiple different types of units,
the question apparently arises which is ’the ultimate’ unit of selection. The only rea-
sonable answers is multi-level selection (cf. [62, p. 350]), as natural selection will,
under certain circumstances (cf. 5.1), necessarily occur. Clearly, the direction of se-
lection varies from level to level: e.g. a trait which is beneficial for the individual
may be disadvantageous for the group. However, whatever the biological hierarchy
pre-supposed in this discussion looks like1, it has to be noticed that the hierarchy itself
is a result of evolution. Hence, the question is not to decide if genes or organisms or
groups are the units of selection, but rather to explain how the ”major transitions in
evolution” (cf. [98]), e.g. from single-cellular life to multicellular organisms or from
solitary individuals to groups, occurred.
Thus, irrespective of the level of selection that we consider, the emergence of novel
units of selection needs to addressed (cf. paragraph ”The origin of units” in subsection
5.1.2). Clearly, this issue can not be explained in general by the theory of natural
selection. However, when thinking about the emergence of a unit on a ’higher’ level, it
is illustrative to notice that, from the point of view of the unit there is no ’up’ or ’down’,
but just one single environment. Organs and cells of an animal are as ’external’ to this
individual as rainfall and predator density. Likewise, the traditional ’inside-outside’
distinction has to be abandoned in favor of one single environment in which the unit
itself is located.
Hence, a hierarchical notion of the biosphere can not be inferred from a purely
evolutionary notion of a unit, but rather has to be rejected as conceptually deceptive in
an evolutionary context. Stated in other words, the theory of natural selection distin-
guishes between unit and environment, but neither implies nor requires a hierarchical
structure of the biosphere. Nonetheless, if emergence is understood as a cross-level
phenomenon, a theory of emergence would also yield a theory of a hierarchical struc-
tured domain.
5.1.2 Prerequisites of natural selection
Apart from the apparent prerequisites of natural selection outlined at the beginning of
this section (i.e. section 5.1), several less obvious implications can be identified.
First and almost trivially, a distinction between unit and environment has to be made
to allow for natural selection to work. Second, the units which are shaped by natural
selection according to their differing reproductive success have to come into being in
the first place. The question of their origin respectively their emergence needs to be
addressed. This can indeed be considered as the central question of this inquiry. Third,
it has been claimed that evolutionary units exhibit a certain modular structure to allow
for adaptation through the accumulation of minor improvements.
1Compare e.g. [97] for a different hierarchical structure of the biosphere.
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Within the following paragraphs, we will have a more detailed look at this prereq-
uisites.
Unit and environment
First of all a distinction between unit and environment, respectively between one unit
and the other, has to be made to allow for a reasonable notion of an evolutionary unit.
Stated in other words, natural selection is a mechanism acting upon discrete entities,
and can not be understood as some sort of ’change over time in a homogeneous, contin-
uous media’. Clearly, ’live’ could be seen as a continuous phenomenon, but in that case
a re-formulation of the theory of natural selection would be needed. Thus, probably
the most fundamental distinction which needs to be made to allow for natural selection
to work is the distinction between environment and unit, which entails the distinction
between multiple different units.
Even though the interdependence between unit and environment, as well as the
interchangeability of their roles, have provided important insights such as the notion
of niche-construction or the rejection of the lock-key model (cf. subsection 2.2.1),
dissolving the boundary between unit and environment is no option (cf. subsection
2.2.2). Differential fitness as differing reproduction rates, together with the comple-
mentary notion of selective pressure from the environment - which corresponds to an
external-driven change in reproduction rates - are essential components of evolution
through natural selection, which do require a well-defined notion of unit.
Thus, instead of adhering to one specific notion of unit, may it be reductionist
(gene-centric) or holistic (Developmental Systems - cf. section 2.1), it appears reason-
able to seek a problem-specific understanding of unit.
The origin of units
In continuation of the paragraph on the ”Level of selection” (cf. subsection 5.1.1),
the origin of units can be seen in a hierarchical context. More precisely, when seeking
a model to explain the emergence of units, we can distinguish two alternative views
(cf. Figure 5.1), which can be seen as hierarchical insofar as they represent bottom-up
respectively top-down notions of the formation of units.
On the one hand, the formation of a unit can be seen as a process which, departing
from multiple interacting low-level units, leads to the formation of a higher-level unit.
This corresponds to the traditional notion of emergence and has been exemplified by
Kauffman’s autocatalytic set theory (cf. subsection 3.2.1). Also the matrix of interact-
ing developmental resources reconstructing a life cycle can be seen as such a bottom-up
notion of emergence (cf. subsection 2.2.1). In particular, the concept of trait groups
(cf. subsection 2.2.3), which is based on the selection of mutually beneficial traits, i.e.
on positive feedback, can be seen as the prototype of this type of emergence.
On the other hand, the formation of a unit can also be seen as based on the in-
troduction of a distinction between unit and environment. This concept is primarily
driven by epistemological considerations, but can equally be understood as a mech-
anistic explanation. Both aspect are condensed in Maturana’s concept of autopoiesis
(cf. subsection 4.2.3), which is meant to be understood both as a cognitive as well
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Figure 5.1: On the left hand side, a bottom-up notion of emergence is illustrated, while
on the right hand side, the process of unit-formation understood as internal differenti-
ation (top-down) is depicted. Ultimately both scenarios lead to similar results, namely
to the establishment of a unit-environment boundary. For details, refer to subsection
5.1.2, ”The origin of units”.
as a biological process. Indeed, both evolution (phylogenesis) as well as development
(ontogenesis) can easily be understood as the internal differentiation of ’life itself’
respectively ’one single organism’.
However, no matter if a bottom-up notion of emergence or a top-down notion of
internal differentiation is favored, the pre-existence of some sort of unit(s) is required.
Bottom-up emergence relies on multiple low-level units, while internal differentiation
requires the presence of a high-level unit. Among the compared concepts, Maturana’s
notion of autopoiesis as self-creation appears to yield the most suitable approach to this
difficulty, in particular if combined with N. Luhman’s claim that ’the horizon [high-
level unit] always remains invisible’.
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Modular units
Both S. Kauffman (cf. subsection 3.2.3) as well as P. Griffiths et al. (cf. subsection
2.2.3) have claimed that evolutionary units need to exhibit a certain modular structure
respectively need to be composed of ”quasi-independent” components to allow for
natural selection. The argument behind this claim can be recapitulated in the following
three steps:
1.) Natural selection acts upon certain discrete traits, which also define the dimen-
sions of phenospace.
2.) Given that each position in phenospace is associated with a certain fitness, a
change (variation) in phenospace corresponds to a change in fitness. If a small
change in phenospace corresponds to a big change in fitness, the resulting fitness
landscape does not allow for the accumulation of minor improvements. ’Walking
uphill’ on such a landscape will soon get stuck in a poor local optimum. Like-
wise, if a big change in phenospace corresponds to a small change in fitness,
there is no selective pressure at all, for the fitness landscape is indifferent to any
change in phenospace. Thus, phenospace and fitness need to be correlated such
that a small change of one trait causes only a small change in fitness, while a big
change of the phenotype yields a big difference in fitness.
3.) If an evolutionary unit is highly integrated, a change in one single trait greatly
alters the fitness of the unit as a whole, for the combination of traits matters.
Hence, evolutionary units have to be modular, i.e. their traits have to be quasi-
independent from each other to allow for separate adaptation of the individual
traits and accumulative, gradual evolution.
Just by itself, this argument would pose no problem. However, in general, evolu-
tionary units as e.g. organisms are considered to be highly integrated. For example,
during the evolution of homo sapiens, a strong positive feedback among hands, cog-
nitive capacities and upright walking is assumed. The fine motor skills of the hands
are useless as long as the hands are needed for walking, just as the most capable brain
is of no benefit without proper tools (speech, hands) to interact with the environment.
Indeed, these traits are mutually amplifying their overall utility and thus, can hardly be
understood as (quasi-)independent. Consequently, re-examining the above argument
appears to be necessary.
The critical step of the above argument seems to be that, departing from the required
correlation between phenospace and fitness (which we accept), a certain conclusion
concerning phenotypic organization is drawn, namely quasi-independence. Given that
phenospace is defined via discrete traits, this conclusion relies
a.) on an identification of traits with components, i.e. with parts of the evolutionary
unit and
b.) on a non-linear notion of the overall fitness. This means that the traits respec-
tively parts of the units can not be adapted independently in order to maximize
the overall fitness, i.e. the optimization problem can not be decomposed into
partial problems.
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Given that b.) corresponds to our holistic notion of an evolutionary unit, the root
of the apparent contradiction might be hidden in a.). Even though we are currently not
able to provide a truly satisfying answer to this problem, the following might serve as
a first trace: Both the dimensions of phenospace as well as the parts (components) that
a unit is made of are subject to evolution as well. During evolution, novel parts emerge
within an evolutionary unit, i.e. the internal organization of a unit undergoes a process
of differentiation. Thus, the problem of modularity outlined in this paragraph appears
to be related to the problem of the emergence of novel units discussed in the previous
one.
However, we might tentatively concluded that nature does not only ”select for out-
come” (reproductive success), but also for how this outcome is achieved (modular or-
ganization). It is tempting to suspect that phenotypic integration itself is subject to
natural selection. Even though this solution to the modularity-problem has also been
proposed by Kauffman himself as a ’self-tuning of evolution’ (cf. subsection 3.2.3), it
appears to us misleading, given that the above argument precisely targets a prerequisite
of natural selection. Hence, it appears to us that a different mechanism, complemen-
tary to natural selection, has to be proposed to explain how modular yet integrated units
necessarily emerge. Note that also a specific balance between stability and variabil-
ity (cf. subsection 3.2.2) is a prerequisite of natural selection, and hence can not be
understood as its consequence. Thus, concerning the network-model proposed by S.
Kauffman to elucidate how this balance is achieved, the question needs to be asked
how this type of networks emerged, for natural selection is only capable to fine tune an
already pre-stabilized balance.
5.2 Living units
In contrast to the previous section, the results discussed herein can be understood as a
reply to the question:
What is a living unit?
Hence, the evolutionary aspect of biological units is completely neglected and thus,
the answer given by Maturana (cf. section 4.2) does not involve concepts like repro-
duction, adaptation, inheritance or DNA2 as the defining criteria of life.
Instead, Maturana proposes autopoietic organization as the defining criteria of liv-
ing units. A living unit is hence defined as a unit which is organized such that it creates
itself. This self-creation is not understood as a single historical event, but rather as
a continuous activity. Reproduction, differential reproduction rates and hence, evolu-
tion are seen as secondary phenomena, which are not ’essential’ to life, but merely a
consequence of continuous autopoiesis.
Furthermore, autopoiesis is understood as a fundamentally cognitive process and
thus, living units and cognitive units are seen as identical. This notion of living units
2Which is in particular remarkably when compared to R. Dawkins gene-centric concept of evolution-
ary units. Indeed, most biologists would be flabbergasted by this notion of life.
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leads to the problem of understanding cognition, which is an intrinsically circular prob-
lem: how to understand understanding? Maturana concludes that a representationistic
approach to this question must fail (cf. subsection 4.1.1), because the circularity of
cognition (autopoiesis) requires to unite description and construction: only if cogni-
tion is seen as a constructive as well as a descriptive process, a consistent description of
cognition (autopoiesis) is possible: as self-description (cf. subsection 4.1.2). This was
formulated by Maturana as the ”emergence of the observer” (cf. subsection 4.2.1).
The central operation which brings forth simultaneously the observer (unit) and its
world (environment) is the distinction, and by writing (respectively reading) this very
lines, according to Maturana, the observer as such emerges.
Besides emphasizing the subject dependent nature of cognition, Maturana rejects
solipsism as a misunderstanding of constructivism (cf. subsection 4.1.3). The misun-
derstanding of constructivism which leads to solipsism relies in demanding objectivis-
tic properties from a subject dependent cognitive domain: if e.g. someone demands to
know how the ’objective truth’ of the statement ”There are no objectively true state-
ments” shall be proven, he (or she) apparently misunderstood the statement by reading
it as an objective description. In this context, science is no longer the guardian of the
truth itself, but merely one specific, socio-culturally determined way to answer self-
formulated questions.
Hence, apart from autopoiesis, the scientific answer to the above formulated ques-
tion is that units are, in general, constructed by the observer. Consequently, the emer-
gence of a unit has to be understood as a cognitive phenomenon, i.e. the question is
not how a unit comes into being, but how or why the observer makes the underlying
distinction.
Even though this observation highlights an important aspect of a variety of bio-
logical units, namely the arbitrariness contained in their definition, the explanatory
potential of this approach seems to be rather limited. Do we really gain a deeper under-
standing of living units if ’units’ in general are seen as necessarily subject dependent
construction? Metaphorically speaking, this approach appears to solve the problem
by proving that the problem does not exist. Likewise, the notions of structure deter-
mined (autonomous) systems and structural coupling appear to us rather problematic
(cf. subsection 4.2.2). The distinction between ’defining the possible state transitions’
(unit) and ’choosing one of the possible state transitions’ (environment respectively
another unit) upon which Maturana’s notion of autonomy and self-determination is
based hardly captures the common notion of causation. Even if a system determines
the space of possible future states it may enter, as long as the environment determines
(selects) which of this states the system actually enters, the system can hardly be seen
as autonomous.
5.3 Functional units in molecular-biological networks
We are now returning to our initial question, namely:
What are functional, evolutionary units in molecular-biological networks?
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As we will see in the following lines, most of the results presented in the previous
sections (i.e. sections 5.1 and 5.2) can directly be applied to molecular networks.
But before doing so, it is worth recapitulating some biological aspects of molecular-
biological networks (cf. section 1.1).
First of all there is a broad agreement among biologists that molecular networks
exhibit a modular (cf. [10, 17, 12, 19]), possibly even hierarchical structure (cf. [99,
4, 8]). Hence, it is not the network as a whole which is responsible for every aspect of
cellular behavior, but rather do subnetworks exist which performer specific, dedicated
functions. These subnetworks, also referred to as ”functional modules” or ”units”, are
assumed to be subject to evolution and hence, they can be considered as a trait passed
on from parents to offspring (cf. [20, 28, 18]). As functional traits are conserved by
natural selection, a cross-species comparison of molecular interaction networks can
be used to identify similar, i.e. conserved and thus, hopefully also functional sub-
networks. Stated in other words, as functionality implies conservation, conservation
provides strong evidence that the corresponding trait (body plan, DNA sequence, pro-
tein structure, network architecture, etc.) is functional (cf. [29, 30]). An alternative,
less convincing approach to identify functional modules in molecular networks is based
on the assumption that functional modules are dense clusters which are only loosely
related to the rest of the network (cf. e.g. [22]).
This biological understanding of functional modules as evolutionary units is in ac-
cordance with our notion of the universality of natural selection (cf. subsection 5.1.1).
As outlined in the paragraph on multiple levels of selection, functional units will be
subject to natural selection, given that several requirement (cf. ibid.) are met. Hence,
not only the nodes of the network (proteins, genes or the like) or the network as a
whole have to be understood as shaped by evolution, but also the modules within the
network. However, as already pointed out previously (cf. subsection 5.1.2), the most
basic requirement of natural selection is the presence of a unit as such.
Interestingly, the presence or ’existence’ of functional modules within a network
also represents a requirement for the evolution of the network as a whole. As out-
lined in the paragraph on modular units (cf. ibid.), there is strong evidence supporting
the notion of modular evolutionary units. According to this arguments, only modu-
lar units are capable of evolution through natural selection and hence, if a complete
molecular-biological network (e.g. the metabolic network of a cell) is considered as
an evolutionary unit, the existence of modules within this network is an immediate
consequence.
Thus, both for the evolution of the unit itself, as well as for the evolution of the
network it is embedded in, the origin of the unit (cf. subsection 5.1.2) has to be clari-
fied. This origin respectively emergence can, once more, be understood in two different
ways: Either as an assembly of multiple low-level entities, such as genes, proteins and
the like, or as a differentiation of high-level functionality, i.e. as a division of cellular
labor (cf. figure 5.1). While the first approach leads to a structural notion of units, the
second one yields a functional understanding3. However, no matter if the origin of a
3Just as e.g. a chair can be either be defined via certain structural characteristics or via the function
it fulfills.
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unit is understood as an assembly of low-level units or as a division of high-level units,
in both cases the pre-existence of some unit(s) is required. A first step towards solving
this apparently paradox situation might be the following rejection of hierarchies, i.e.
the claim that in a certain sense there is no difference between ’low-level assembly’
and ’high-level division’.
As pointed out before (cf. subsection 5.1.2), the notion of a hierarchy in which
high-levels and low-levels can be distinguished does not follow from the theory of nat-
ural selection. Indeed, when focusing on the evolutionary aspects of functional network
modules, the only applicable distinction is the one between unit and environment. As
a consequence, the environment of a unit has to be understood as the union over both
high- and low-level entities. Hence, the environment of a functional unit can not be
understood as ’all the nodes which are not part of the unit’, just as the unit itself can
not be understood as ’all the nodes which are part of the unit’. A protein such as p53,
which plays a central role in apoptosis (cf. figure 1.2), is as external to apoptosis as a
functional unit as the general condition of the cell. Stated in other words, a mutation in
p53 is just as much an environmental factor to apoptosis as a change in the general state
of the cell which might trigger the process, e.g. toxic stress. Likewise, the individual
cells making up a certain organ are as external to this organ as the organism around it.
As the ultimate consequence, we have to agree with Maturana (cf. subsection
5.2) who proposes a subject dependent, but nonetheless non-arbitrary understanding
of functional units. As follows from the above rejection of hierarchical structures, the
only criteria left to define a unit is the distinction between unit and environment. Thus,
the most basic requirement every unit has to fulfill to be rightfully considered as such is
constructed through the observer respectively subject dependent operation of distinc-
tion. What makes apoptosis a unit is not the existence of a ’natural boundary’ between
apoptosis and the remaining molecular processes of a cell, but rather the utility of the
underlying distinction for the observer. As the term ’utility’ suggests, the operation of
distinction is non-arbitrary, for the utility (functionality) of a distinction depends on
the cognitive context of the observer (cf. Maturana’s notion of science in subsection
4.1.3).
However, in the cognitive context of applied sciences, the utility of Maturana’s
understanding of living units as cognitive units (cf. ibid.) appears to have only limited
potential. In particular, the status of functional units in molecular-biological networks
remains unclear, given that his focus is clearly on cells as the primary units of live and
autopoiesis.
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Appendix A
ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH
The rise of high-throughput techniques in biological research has allowed the si-
multaneous assessment of multiple molecular parameters and eventually led to the
reconstruction of molecular-biological interaction networks. These networks are as-
sumed to be organized in a modular manner, where ’modules’ are seen as dedicated
functional units responsible for specific cellular behaviors. Hence, the identification
of functional units is a crucial step towards understanding the molecular mechanisms
behind phenotypic observables.
Various screening methods exists to detect functional units in networks, but in the
context of applied sciences, none of these methods involves a thorough discussion of
the employed notion of functional unit. In order to address this very need, i.e. to an-
swer the question ’what are functional units in biology?’, the following authors respec-
tively approaches were investigated: (A) Developmental Systems Theory is a branch of
the philosophy of biology which rejects a gene-centric notion of biological unity and
replaces it with the concept of a ’developmental system’. As this concept typically ex-
tends the traditional phenotype (i.e. the organism), the need for a principled definition
of biological unity is inherent to this approach. (B) In contrast to this, Stuart Kauffman
concentrates on the limits of natural selection as a means to explain the order present in
biological units. Given that in biology, ’functionality’ ultimately refers to reproductive
success, his investigations are centered around an evolutionary understanding of units.
(C) Finally, departing from epistemological considerations, Humberto Maturana pro-
poses the concept of autopoiesis (self-creation) as the (self-)defining criteria of living
units.
The major results obtained from a comparison of this sources are the following
ones: Given that natural selection is a generic mechanism which is not limited to any
specific level of selection (genetic, cellular, ...), seeking the ’ultimate unit of evolution’
is meaningless. Hence, if functional units satisfy certain preconditions, most notably
a modular structure, they are subject to evolution as well. However, their origin is
not clarified by natural selection. In this respect, a bottom-up notion of emergence as
the ’assembly of low-level entities’ (e.g. genes or proteins) can be distinguished from
a top-down notion of emergence as the ’division of cellular labor’. From a systems-
theoretic perspective, both notions can be understood as complementary, which is in
accordance with Maturana’s claim that ultimately, each ’unit’ is constructed by the ob-
server dependent operation of distinction. From this point of view, a structural criteria
to identify functional units in general, as seeked by the applied sciences, can not exist.
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Appendix B
ABSTRACT IN GERMAN
Durch die Entwicklung von Hochdurchsatz-Verfahren in der Biologie wurde die
gleichzeitige Messung einer Vielzahl molekularer Parameter mo¨glich, was zur Rekon-
struktion molekular-biologischer Interaktions-Netzwerke fu¨hrte. Man geht davon aus,
daß diese Netzwerke in funktionale Einheiten bzw. Module zerlegt werden ko¨nnen,
welche jeweils fu¨r ein spezifisches zellula¨res Verhalten verantwortlich sind. Die Iden-
tifikation dieser Einheiten ist daher von zentraler Relevanz.
Im naturwissenschaftlichen Kontext existieren verschiedene Methoden zur Erken-
nung derartiger Einheiten, aber keine dieser Methoden beinhaltet eine explizite Def-
inition des zugrunde liegenden Versta¨ndnisses von ’funktionaler Einheit’. Um genau
dieses Defizit zu adressieren, d.h. um die Frage zu beantworten, was im biologischen
Bereich unter funktionaler Einheit zu verstehen ist, wurden die folgenden Disziplinen
bzw. Autoren herangezogen: (A) Developmental Systems Theory ist ein Zweig der
Philosophie der Biologie, der ein gen-zentrisches Versta¨ndnis von biologischer Ein-
heit ablehnt und durch das Konzept des ’Developmental Systems’ ersetzt. (B) Stuart
Kauffman hingegen konzentriert sich auf jene Aspekte einer biologischen Einheit, die
nicht mittels natu¨rlicher Selektion zu erkla¨ren sind und diskutiert Selbst-Organisation
als das zugrunde liegende Prinzip. (C) Humberto Maturana positioniert die Frage nach
der biologischen Einheit im epistemologischen Kontext und fu¨hrt somit erkenntnisthe-
oretische Aspekte in die Diskussion ein. Eine lebendige Einheit wird von ihm immer
auch als kognitive Einheit gesehen.
Die zentralen Ergebnisse aus einem Vergleich dieser Quellen sind folgende: Natu¨r-
liche Selektion ist ein allgemeingu¨ltiger Mechanismus, der in unterschiedlichsten Be-
reichen gleichermaßen wirksam ist, sofern gewisse Bedingungen erfu¨llt sind. Ins-
besondere mu¨ssen die Einheiten der Selektion modular aufgebaut sein. Der Ursprung
der Einheiten wird durch natu¨rliche Selektion nicht gekla¨rt. Bezu¨glich dieser Frage
lassen sich zweierlei Arten von Emergenz unterscheiden: als Kombination vieler ’klei-
ner’ Einheiten (Gene, Proteine, ...) oder als Ausdifferenzierung einer ’großer’ Einheit
(’zellula¨re Arbeitsteilung’). Aus systemtheoretischer Perspektive, i.e. sofern der Be-
griff der Einheit auf die fundamentale Unterscheidung zwischen ’innen’ und ’außen’
reduziert wird, werden beider Varianten als komplementa¨r erkennbar. Dies wird ge-
stu¨tzt durch Maturan’s Feststellung daß jegliche Einheit durch die Beobachter abha¨n-
gige Operation der Unterscheidung erschaffen wird. Insofern muss die Suche nach
allgemeinen strukturellen Merkmalen funktionaler Einheiten in Netzwerken als pro-
blematisch angesehen werden.
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